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The Problem of the Faithless Principal: 
Fiduciary Theory and the Capacities of 
Clients 
W. Bradley Wendel* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Philosophers sometimes criticize the lawyer-client relationship for 
rendering the lawyer “at best systematically amoral.” Legal ethics theorists 
typically analyze the lawyer-client relationship in terms of role-
differentiation or a separation of public and private moralities. But if we 
concentrate instead on the allocation of responsibility for decisionmaking 
within a fiduciary relationship, the idea of differentiation or separation of 
moral spheres falls away somewhat . This Article considers two issues 
raised by the allocation of moral responsibility within the lawyer-client 
relationship. First, why should the agency structure of the lawyer-client 
relationship, with its associated fiduciary duties, do anything to affect the 
moral situation of the lawyer? There must a bridge between the legal 
concepts of agency and fiduciary duties and the moral notions of authority, 
obligation, accountability, dignity, equality, and respect. That connection 
is provided by an insight of fiduciary theory, that lawyers substitutively 
exercise their clients’ capacities. In the context of the lawyer-client 
relationship, the critical capacity is that for giving reasons in response to a 
demand for accountability. Second, what happens when the client fails to 
satisfy standards of reasonableness? There may be occasions when the 
client is behaving capriciously or otherwise not exhibiting the capacity 
essential to moral agency. If true, then the earlier concern resurfaces: The 
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Auckland, at the Sixth Annual Fiduciary Law Workshop, at Washington University – St. 
Louis, and at a faculty workshop at Cornell. I am grateful to workshop participants and 
owe special thanks for detailed comments to Deborah DeMott, Evan Fox-Decent, Andrew 
Gold, Sheri Johnson, Paul Miller, Jeff Rachlinski, Teddy Rave, Steve Shiffrin, and Nelson 
Tebbe. The author gratefully acknowledges the research funding provided by the Judge 
Albert Conway Memorial Fund for Legal Research, established by the William C. and 
Joyce C. O’Neil Charitable Trust to honor the memory of Judge Conway, Chief Judge of 
the New York State Court of Appeals from 1954 to 1959, and his son, Hewitt A. Conway, 
a member of the Cornell Law School Class of 1949. 
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lawyer-client relationship would in fact be an amoral domain, as opposed 
to a moral division of labor, if the client has not acted as a responsible 
moral agent in determining the objectives of the professional 
representation. In these situations, the lawyer may be called upon to 
assume greater responsibility for providing reasons in response to a 
demand by others for accountability.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The lawyer-client relationship establishes a normative division of 
labor. The client determines the objectives of the representation and makes 
decisions about the impact of a proposed course of action on third parties 
and the public interest in general. The lawyer’s role is then to use 
reasonable skill and diligence to carry out the client’s lawful objectives. 
As a result of this allocation of authority, lawyers stand apart from their 
clients and their clients’ objectives. In general, lawyers do not rightly bear 
moral responsibility for having nasty clients who do nasty things. But why 
should this be the case? Lawyers remain moral agents, even when acting 
in a professional capacity. One who assists another in harmful activity is 
ordinarily blameworthy for providing assistance, even if acting at the 
direction of the other. On the principal-agent structure of the lawyer-client 
relationship, this is a real puzzle. However, considering the fiduciary 
nature of the lawyer-client relationship both explains the moral non-
accountability of lawyers and suggests contexts in which lawyers may 
have to assume additional responsibility for their clients’ actions. 
Fiduciary theory shows that lawyers substitutively exercise their clients’ 
capacities. The relevant client capacity is that of all moral agents, namely, 
giving reasons in response to another’s demand for accountability. 
Additionally, the client’s capacity must be understood politically, in the 
context of the norms regulating relationships among citizens of a 
pluralistic community. 
The law in general, and the legal relations of lawyer-client-third 
party, are best explained and justified as recognition of the dignity of free 
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and equal citizens of a political community who require a means to 
facilitate peaceful coexistence, cooperation on mutually beneficial 
projects, and some degree of social solidarity against a background of 
fundamental disagreement about goods, values, and rights.1 Accordingly, 
there is a form of reciprocal respect built into giving legal reasons for one’s 
actions. This mutual recognition of others as free and rational agents is 
what distinguishes the law, which makes purportedly legitimate demands, 
from the exercise of raw power.2 Lawyers permit clients to exercise a 
distinctive type of capacity, which is giving legal reasons to justify actions 
that are permitted or required by the community’s legal entitlements. The 
lawyer accordingly provides expert skill and knowledge with respect to 
the client’s legal rights and duties but leaves the client free to make all-
things-considered decisions, including those pertaining to the demands for 
justification by those affected by the actions of clients.  
This Article considers two issues raised by the allocation of moral 
responsibility within the lawyer-client relationship. First, why should the 
agency structure of the lawyer-client relationship, with its associated 
fiduciary duties, do anything to affect the moral situation of the lawyer? 
There needs to be a bridge between the legal concepts of agency and 
fiduciary duties and the moral notions of authority, obligation, 
accountability, dignity, equality, and respect. The knee-jerk invocation by 
lawyers of the principle of “zealous advocacy within the bounds of the 
law”3 is question-begging on its own terms. The answer is elaborated in 
Section II. Philosophers sometimes criticize the lawyer-client relationship 
for rendering the lawyer “at best systematically amoral.”4 Legal ethics 
theorists generally analyze the lawyer-client relationship in terms of role-
 
1. See generally SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011); W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS 
AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010); Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. 
L. REV. 1 (2008). The terminology of free and equal citizens is from the later work of 
Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 49–50, 77–78, 85 (1993). Rainer Forst 
calls this a conception of ourselves as moral persons, to be contrasted with ethical identities 
rooted in conceptions of the good. See RAINER FORST, CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE: POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY BEYOND LIBERALISM AND COMMUNITARIANISM 35–36, 181–83 (John M.M. 
Farrell trans., 2002). The fiduciary conception of legal ethics defended here begins with a 
conception of persons as moral agents, not with a political conception of persons as 
citizens, but it ends up with Rawls in understanding reasonableness as a “political ideal of 
democratic citizenship.” RAWLS, supra, at 62. 
2. See STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT 21–22 (2006); W. 
Bradley Wendel, The Rule of Law and Legal -Process Reasons in Attorney Advising, 99 
B.U. L. REV. 107 (2019). Compare Daniel Markovits’s distinction between brute demands 
and assertions of right. See DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 188–89 (2008).  
3. See, e.g., Micheal E. Tigar, Litigators’ Ethics, 67 TENN. L. REV. 409 (2000) 
(discussing zealous advocacy as a principle of litigation ethics). 
4. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Hum. Rts. 
1 (1975).  
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differentiation or a separation of public and private moralities.5 But the 
idea of differentiation or separation of moral spheres falls away somewhat 
if we concentrate instead on the allocation of responsibility for decision-
making within a fiduciary relationship. The lawyer’s moral perspective is 
not limited or “amoral,” but rather is the client’s moral perspective, at least 
with regard to the objectives of the representation. Understanding the 
lawyer-client relationship as deeply connected with liberal political theory 
clarifies some of the issues in dispute among theorists of the fiduciary 
responsibilities of lawyers.  
The second question, addressed in Section III, concerns the 
implications for the fiduciary relationship of the client’s incapacity to act 
on reasons. Responsibility may fall through the cracks if neither the client 
nor the lawyer exercises the capacity to provide a justification that is 
responsive to the interests of those rights-holders who can demand 
accountability. In contrast to the familiar problem of the faithless agent,6 
the problem here involves a principal who fails to satisfy standards of 
reasonableness. The law is fundamentally a reason-giving practice and the 
social role of the lawyer is intelligible only on that understanding of the 
function of law. It is therefore a conceptual, and not only a pragmatic, 
point that the lawyer-client relationship presupposes a client with the 
capacity to exercise moral agency. The centrality of client capacity is 
apparent in the law governing lawyers, which struggles to define the duties 
of a lawyer representing a client with diminished capacity to make 
decisions in connection with the representation.7 Nevertheless, in some 
contexts (such as the representation of organizational clients) lawyers 
sometimes overlook the importance of client capacity. Corporate and 
agency law create a chain of command which structure the representation 
of entity clients in most cases. Rules respecting the representation of entity 
clients presume a formal hierarchy of control. If the usual decision-making 
process breaks down to the point that it is no longer reasoned, a lawyer 
may face the possibility of unclear or conflicting duties.8 Similarly, 
 
5. See, e.g., Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 (1980).  
6. See infra notes 25-30, and accompanying text.  
7. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 1.14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2012); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24 (AM. LAW INST. 2000); see 
generally Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008) (positing a “gray area” of client 
competency between competence to stand trial and the capacity to exercise the right of self-
representation). 
8. A similar problem may exist for lawyers representing classes or parties in non-
class aggregated claims. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: 
Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 
(2000); Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805 (1997); 
Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
287 (2003); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE 
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lawyers for the government ordinarily defer to an agency head or the 
President for instructions, but the current President’s capriciousness has 
occasionally challenged this default model. Finally, this section will 
briefly consider some of the potential disruption threatened by automated 
systems intended to replace lawyers as providers of professional services. 
The issue, in that case, is whether artificial intelligence systems have the 
ability to provide the reasons that are responsive to a third-party demand 
for accountability. 
II.  LEGAL ETHICS AND FIDUCIARY THEORY.  
Moral agency is the competence, responsibility, and capacity for the 
mutual recognition of claims and reasons.9 An ordinary, natural-person 
client of a lawyer can be assumed to be a moral agent. As a moral agent, 
the client is accountable to others who are affected by his or her actions 
and must be prepared to answer (at least hypothetically) a demand for 
justification from others. A lawyer representing that client has a set of 
powers and duties that are “a form of authority ordinarily derived from the 
legal personality” of the client.10 The lawyer’s authority is the 
“substitutive exercise” of the client’s legal capacity.11 It should, therefore, 
follow that the lawyer’s moral situation vis-à-vis others who are affected 
by the client’s actions is identical to the client’s. However, lawyers claim 
that they should not be judged according to the moral status of their clients’ 
objectives; nor are they accountable for the moral costs of the lawful 
means they use to assist their clients in carrying out those projects.12 
Lawyers may substitutively exercise their clients’ capacities, but somehow 
they manage to escape moral criticism for the choices made by their clients 
and the consequences of those decisions. This so-called principle of non-
accountability is a significant problem for philosophical legal ethics. 
 
DAME L. REV. 913 (1998). To take the simpler case of class actions, if the class is viewed 
as an entity in itself, and conflicts arise among its members regarding the objectives of the 
class, the lawyer may be caught between competing interests with no ready way of 
ascertaining the interests of the client. The result may be a significant increase in the 
unaccountable power of lawyers for the class. See generally Susan P. Koniak & George M. 
Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without Clients or Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129 
(2001). 
9. See DARWALL, supra note 2, at 21; T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH 
OTHER 23 (1998) (defining a moral agent as a creature that has the “capacity to recognize, 
assess, and be moved by reasons”). 
10. Paul B. Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
FIDUCIARY LAW 63, 70 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (emphasis in 
original). 
11. Id. at 71, 79 (observing that the authority of agents “takes the form of specific 
legal capacities that are presumptively personal capacities of the principal”). 
12. See generally TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES? A DEFENCE OF THE 
STANDARD CONCEPTION OF THE LAWYER’S ROLE 75 (2009); Murray L. Schwartz, The 
Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669 (1978). 
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Lawyers strongly believe the principle holds, but it appears inconsistent 
with the moral agency of both clients and lawyers, and the fiduciary role 
of lawyers.  
Two competing paradigms frame much of the debate in legal ethics.13 
The first assumes a weak client dominated by a strong lawyer.14 Think of 
the type of vulnerability experienced by an unsophisticated one-time 
consumer of legal services, such as a matrimonial or personal-injury client. 
Owing to the opacity of professional expertise, the client is unable to 
monitor the work performed by the lawyer; the client is left to take it on 
trust that the lawyer will exercise the required level of competence and 
diligence, and refrain from self-dealing.15 This is the familiar “faithless 
agent” problem, common to many fiduciary relationships.16 The general 
principal-agent problem arises when one party, the agent, has the power to 
affect the interests of the principal. The agent may be motivated to act in 
her own interests and not the interests of the principal, and the principal 
lacks the ability to continuously monitor the agent to ensure the agent is 
always acting in the principal’s interests.17 The principal-agent problem 
occurs in a wide range of situations, including the trustee-beneficiary 
relationship and the governance of corporations by officers and directors 
for the benefit of shareholders. On this assumption, fiduciary duties are 
necessary to redress the imbalance of power in the relationship.18 The 
fiduciary owes duties of undivided loyalty to the beneficiary and will be 
liable for any instance of self-dealing or exploiting the advantages inherent 
in a relationship of inequality and vulnerability.  
The second paradigm assumes a weak lawyer dominated by a strong 
client. Here the risk is that the lawyer will not be able to prevent the client 
from committing acts that harm specific third parties (such as investors) 
 
13. See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 718–19 
(1987); see generally Stephen L. Pepper, Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With 
Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client), 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1069 (2015).  
14. See generally David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 WIS. L. 
REV. 454 (1981); Wasserstrom, supra note 4. 
15. See DARE, supra note 12, at 89–92; see generally Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, 
Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey 
& Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Conflict of Interest Regulation, 82 IOWA 
L. REV. 965 (1997); Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Lawyers’ Conflicts Of 
Interest, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 579 (1992). 
16. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Toward Universal Fiduciary Principles, 39 QUEEN’S 
L.J. 391 (2014). 
17. See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the 
Principal-Agent Problem, 51 ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: 
The Principal’s Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 134 (1973). 
18. See, e.g., Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 234, 
254 (2011) (citing Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226, 289 (Can.)). 
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or are contrary to the public interest. The concern motivating this strand 
of legal ethics theory is that the lawyer’s role provides no meaningful 
constraint on anti-social behavior. The law is malleable enough to permit 
a lawyer to conclude that the client’s proposed course of action, no matter 
how nasty, is lawful. The concern with self-dealing under this paradigm is 
that clients will act according only to their private interests, with no 
institutional mechanism in place to act with due concern for the public 
good or general welfare of society.19 It is less obvious why the power 
imbalance in this class of cases calls for the deployment of fiduciary 
norms, which in their core application are intended to reinforce duties to 
the principal. However, scholars who have considered the law governing 
lawyers through the lens of fiduciary theory have shown it to be a complex 
blend of private and public law norms.20 The principal-agent problem takes 
on a particularly interesting dimension in the context of the lawyer-client 
relationship, however, due to the frequency with which moral issues, not 
just matters of self-interest, arise in the course of the representation of 
clients by lawyers. The lawyer-client relationship, to a much greater extent 
than most fiduciary associations, is largely aimed at facilitating the 
principal’s dealings with others, including addressing moral questions 
concerning the permissibility of the client’s actions. It involves a complex 
set of relational obligations, in which the client can demand accountability 
from the lawyer, but the lawyer can also establish relationships of 
authority in which third parties are accountable to the client, with all of 
these relationships constituted and enforced by state law.  
Consider a simplified example that has long been a staple of the 
normative legal ethics literature.21 A merchant, Bassanio, needs a loan to 
get through a temporary downturn in his business. He borrows $5,000 
from his friend, Antonio, executing a promissory note memorializing his 
agreement to repay the money with interest beginning on a specified date. 
Bassanio, the borrower, now has a moral and legal obligation to repay 
Antonio, the lender. By the time the obligation was due, however, the 
fortunes of the two parties had reversed. Bassanio’s business is flourishing 
while Antonio has fallen upon hard times. When Antonio asks for 
repayment, Bassanio temporizes, saying “I can’t pay you right now – 
maybe later.” At this point in time, most readers would agree that Bassanio 
 
19. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 14–15 
(1988) (discussing THE FEDERALIST NO. 35 (Alexander Hamilton)).  
20. See Alice Woolley, The Lawyer as Fiduciary: Defining Private Law Duties in 
Public Law Relations, 65 U. TORONTO L.J. 285, 289 (2015).  
21. See, e.g., DARE, supra note 12, at 2–3; WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF 
JUSTICE 29 (2000); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 9–10 (1988); Postema, supra 
note 5, at 66; Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1065 (1976). The original case is Zabella v. Pakel. See 
generally Zabella v. Pakel, 242 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957). 
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has an ethical obligation to repay Antonio. A deal’s a deal, and anyway, 
Bassanio has the money to repay the debt.22 But now suppose Antonio 
waits for a couple of years before resorting to legal action to collect his 
debt. By the time he files a lawsuit on the promissory note, the statute of 
limitations has run. Now enter the character of Bassanio’s lawyer, Portia. 
She advises Bassanio that whatever moral obligation he may have to repay 
Antonio, he has no enforceable legal obligation. If he so directed, Portia 
says, she will file a motion to dismiss the claim for untimeliness. As David 
Luban observes, the reaction of most students to this case is that “the 
wealthy defendant is acting badly, [but] they do not see that that is the 
lawyer’s problem.”23 Portia is not morally accountable to Antonio for 
interposing the statute of limitations defense, which serves to defeat his 
demand for repayment.  
Bassanio’s capacity includes understanding himself and Antonio as 
equal. He is thus accountable to Antonio and under an obligation to him: 
In seeing ourselves as mutually accountable, we accord one another the 
standing to demand certain conduct of each other as equal members of 
the moral community . . . . Our dignity includes the standing to hold one 
another to our moral obligations toward each other . . .24 
The same is presumably true of the relationship between Portia and 
Antonio. One remains a responsible moral agent even when acting within 
a social role such as that of a lawyer. Granted, the presupposition of 
fiduciary theory is that the lawyer is exercising the client’s capacities. 
Bassanio may decide to be a jerk and not repay Antonio. That is his choice 
and he has no legal obligation to repay the debt. But it is less clear why 
Portia should be exempt from moral accountability for pleading the statute 
of limitations on behalf Bassanio, although it is his legal right. There 
appears to be some alchemical process at work within the lawyer-client 
relationship. Delving into the nature of fiduciary relationships and their 
associated duties can explain why lawyers are legal agents for their clients 
and remain moral agents while acting in a professional capacity yet are not 
morally accountable for their clients’ actions.25  
 
22. As the Seventh Circuit put it, “the defendant who was then in a position of some 
affluence . . . should feel obligated to pay an honest debt to his old friend . . . and 
countryman.” Zabella, 242 F.2d at 455. 
23. LUBAN, supra note 21, at 9. My experience teaching this case is very much in line 
with Luban’s. I find it difficult to get students to see that the lawyer’s conduct raises even 
a prima facie evaluation of wrongdoing, requiring some justification linked to the lawyer’s 
role within the legal system. In other words, students have so internalized the standard 
conception that they do not see it is anomalous within moral theory more generally 
conceived.  
24. DARWALL, supra note 2, at 119. 
25. The terminology of moral agency may create confusion when introduced into a 
discussion of relationships governed by the law of agency, so I will try to talk instead about 
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Paul Miller contends that the essence of the fiduciary relationship is 
the exercise of discretionary power by the agent over significant practical 
interests of the principal.26 Discretionary power, according to Miller, is “a 
form of authority [that] implies the freedom to engage in conduct, and 
more specifically to make decisions, not otherwise open to its bearer.”27 
Lawyers are sometimes disparaged by being called tools, but in contrast 
with a literal tool, with no will and freedom of its own, an agent has the 
freedom to make decisions about how to act, coupled with the power to 
change the normative situation of the principal. The actions of agents bind 
principals to contracts, dispositions of property, disclosure of information 
that would otherwise be confidential, and decisions in litigated matters 
such as what claims to assert against adverse parties. In pursuit of the 
client’s objectives, which the client defines after consultation with the 
lawyer, the lawyer has considerable discretion in choosing the means by 
which the client’s objectives are to be pursued.28 Discretionary power is 
therefore a distinctive form of power, in that it extends the legal 
personality of one party (the principal) but does so by engaging the legal 
personality of another party (the agent). In light of the opacity of 
professional expertise, the importance of the interests at stake, and 
frequently the vulnerability of the client to exploitation,29 it is of utmost 
importance that lawyers exercise their discretionary power responsibly. 
Rules of professional conduct, the possibility of civil liability to clients for 
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, and the reputational interests of 
lawyers are all means to safeguard against self-dealing and shirking by 
lawyers.30  
Alice Woolley, responding to Miller and others who characterize 
fiduciary relationships in terms of the power of the agent, contends that 
Miller has it backwards. Lawyers should provide technical assistance to 
facilitate the exercise of discretionary power by clients: 
The normative structure of the lawyer-client relationship requires 
lawyers to facilitate or enable client exercises of discretion, not to 
exercise discretion on their clients’ behalf. To the extent that lawyers 
exercise discretionary authority it is an incidental (and sometimes 
ethically problematic) feature of the lawyer-client relationship rather 
than its essential or defining quality. The central moral feature of the 
 
standards of rationality and responsibility, but occasional reference to the moral agency of 
clients and lawyers is inevitable. 
26. Miller, supra note 18, at 262.  
27. Id. at 71. 
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 16, 21, 26 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2000). 
29. DARE, supra note 12, at 89–93; Miller, supra note 18, at 73. 
30. See generally Ribstein, supra note 15.  
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lawyer’s role is that a lawyer enables and protects a client’s participation 
in the legal system and, in particular, facilitates a client’s ability to make 
decisions about what to do in relation to what the law permits, proscribes, 
or enables.31 
Exercising discretionary power over the interests of a client would 
represent the kind of impermissible paternalism that the standard 
conception of legal ethics is keen to mitigate. Fiduciary duties owed by 
lawyers within the context of the professional relationship should be 
oriented toward empowering clients to make decisions for themselves–to 
act on their capacity as moral agents–and not usurp that authority.32 The 
lawyer does not really have discretionary power because of the constraint 
supplied by (i) the client’s instructions to the lawyer and (ii) the law 
applicable to the client’s proposed course of action. If anything, Woolley 
argues, the exercise of discretionary power over the client’s interests 
would constitute a violation of the law governing lawyers.33 
One aspect of the Woolley versus Miller disagreement is empirical. 
It concerns the extent to which lawyers actually have discretionary power 
over their clients’ interests. In some aspects of the relationship, a lawyer 
plainly does have incentives to do things that benefit her, to the client’s 
detriment, and has the capability to act on her own self-interest. For 
example, a lawyer representing a plaintiff on a contingency fee contract is, 
in effect, a joint owner with the client of the claim.34 The lawyer may want 
to accept an early, but relatively low, settlement offer where the client 
would rather go to trial in hopes of receiving a higher payout. Although 
enforcement may be imperfect, rules of professional conduct and duties 
under tort and agency law requiring the lawyer to inform the client of any 
settlement offer, and to defer to the client’s decisions regarding settlement, 
mitigate the risk of the lawyer taking advantage of an early settlement offer 
and foregoing the opportunity to press on for a better settlement or a more 
favorable judgment at trial.35 In other cases, clients (often with in-house 
legal departments) have sufficient expertise and leverage over their 
retained counsel to significantly limit the discretion of lawyers. As 
Deborah DeMott rightly notes, “[a]n aggressive general counsel of a 
corporation . . . may retain outside law firms and subsequently keep them 
on the tightest of leashes.”36 Fiduciary law often looks at relationships at a 
 
31. Woolley, supra note 20, at 288. 
32. Id. at 306.  
33. Id. at 311–14.  
34. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the 
Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 529 (1978); Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency 
Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1987).  
35. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2012); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 22(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
36. Deborah A. DeMott, The Lawyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 304 (1998). 
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high level of generality, considering lawyer-client relationships as all 
relevantly similar, no matter what the balance of power in a particular 
professional relationship. This is the approach of the Supreme Court of 
Canada,37 and American courts and scholars have traditionally maintained 
that the lawyer-client relationship is inherently a fiduciary one.38  
There is also a deeper theoretical issue between Woolley and Miller. 
This issue pertains to the impact of public-law duties on what would 
otherwise be a relationship constituted by private-law norms. As DeMott 
recognizes in her article on lawyers as agents, lawyers are more than mere 
agents owing to their traditional status as officers of the court and their 
regulation by court-administered (and to some extent professionally-
defined) standards of conduct.39 The lawyer-client relationship is 
constituted in part by the contract between the parties, specifying the scope 
of the representation, the objectives of the relationship, and any limitations 
on the lawyer’s power. But it is also constituted by the content of the 
client’s legal entitlements. Duties, therefore, arise within the lawyer-client 
 
37. See Miller, supra note 18, at 267. 
38. See Susan R. Martyn, Back to the Future: Fiduciary Duty Then and Now, in A 
CENTURY OF LEGAL ETHICS: TRIAL LAWYERS AND THE ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL 
ETHICS 3 (Lawrence J. Fox et al. eds., 2009). One might question whether the analysis in 
this paper depends on lawyers being fiduciaries for their clients, or whether it is sufficient 
to observe that they are agents. The Restatement of Agency observes that “[i]t is open to 
question whether an agent’s unconflicted exercise of discretion as to how to best carry out 
the agent’s undertaking implicates fiduciary doctrines.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 1.01 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2006). However, the Restatement goes on to suggest that 
fiduciary doctrine performs an important gap-filling role: 
An agent’s fiduciary position requires the agent to interpret the principal’s 
statement of authority, as well as any interim instructions received from the 
principal, in a reasonable manner to further purposes of the principal that the 
agent knows or should know, in light of facts that the agent knows or should 
know at the time of acting. An agent thus is not free to exploit gaps or arguable 
ambiguities in the principal’s instructions to further the agent’s self-interest, or 
the interest of another, when the agent’s interpretation does not serve the 
principal’s purposes or interests known to the agent. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2006). The emphasis in 
this paper on the connection between capacity and the ideal of rational deliberation, 
responsibility, moral agency, and accountability, inclines toward reliance on fiduciary 
doctrine in particular, which states heightened duties over and above agency doctrine in 
general. Fiduciary theory does better than agency law in dealing with the background 
assumptions about morality that motivate much of modern liberal political theory and 
jurisprudence, including the status of citizens as free and equal, and the foundation of moral 
obligation in relationships of authority and accountability.  
39. DeMott, supra note 36, at 305–06. Lawyers in the U.S. are not truly self-
regulating. The rules of professional conduct under which lawyers practice in their state of 
admission are adopted by the state’s highest court (or, in New York, by the four Appellate 
Divisions of the Supreme (trial) Court). The organized bar does have a role in defining the 
content of the rules, but only in an advisory capacity. See Bruce A. Green, Lawyers’ 
Professional Independence: Overrated or Undervalued, 46 AKRON L. REV. 599, 603–07 
(2013). 
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relationship that are grounded in the relationship between the client and 
the state, and with other citizens, which are established by the positive law 
of the political community.40 Fiduciary theory should therefore explain 
how the power of lawyers as agents is both constituted and limited by the 
capacities of their clients. Reliance on the principal’s discretionary power 
will not produce the kind of explanation we require of the lawyer-client 
fiduciary relationship.  
Perhaps in a sense one might understand the lawyer’s public-law 
duties by maintaining that the lawyer is entrusted with an obligation of 
guardianship with respect to the public interest. That way of speaking is in 
the neighborhood of the Nineteenth Century theories of social control that 
allocated a significant role to professionals to ensure that the social order 
embodied shared values or the common good of society.41 Lawyers on this 
conception of professionalism were obligated not to seek the advantage of 
their clients, but instead bring to bear their expertise in “understanding 
complex facts” and “us[ing] those facts to envision a new and better 
community.”42 Like Rousseau, who distinguished between private 
interests and the general will, lawyers understood their role as pursuing 
the private interests of clients within the constraints of the public good.43 
Lawyers today, however, are unlikely to refer to the common good of 
society or the general will when working out the content of the duties they 
owe to clients and others. For reasons well summarized elsewhere,44 we 
live in a time of skepticism regarding shared values. Thus, the public ends 
 
40. Woolley, supra note 20, at 289.  
41. See generally PAUL D. CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY: LAW AS A 
PUBLIC PROFESSION (1999); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993); SAMUEL 
HABER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN THE AMERICAN PROFESSIONS 1750–
1900 (1991).  
42. See Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 
(1934).  
43. Kronman refers to the capacity of a good lawyer to view the situation of a client 
with both sympathy and detachment, an attitude that combines perception, imagination, 
and independence. See KRONMAN, supra note 41, at 66–74.  
44. See Rebecca Roiphe, The Decline of Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
649, 661 (2016). One source of this skepticism is the criticism by public choice theorists 
of any non-aggregative concept of the public good. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 572 (5th ed. 1998) (summarizing public-choice position and 
citing foundational works); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF 
CONSENT 13 (1962); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of 
Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, (1988); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983). Another source is the 
liberal political position discussed above, relying on the objective pluralism and 
incommensurability of human goods and values. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND 
DISAGREEMENT  (1999); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); ISAIAH BERLIN, THE 
CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY (Henry Hardy ed. 1990); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF 
FREEDOM (1986); STUART HAMPSHIRE, MORALITY AND CONFLICT (1983); JOHN FINNIS, 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). 
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of the lawyer-client relationship are provided not by a conception of the 
common good of society, but by the positive law enacted by the political 
institutions of the society.45   
Moral pluralists comprising the so-called Second Wave of 
philosophical legal ethics have given a political-moral justification for the 
lawyer’s role obligations. They rely on the function of the legal system to 
resolve conflict and thereby establish a framework for coexistence and 
cooperation.46 This analysis begins with a Kantian assumption about the 
status of human beings as free and equal bearers of dignity. As such, 
individuals enter into relationships of authority and accountability. What 
Stephen Darwall calls second-person authority, which is an essential 
aspect of moral obligation, is a form of mutual respect; it allows us to 
address others with a demand for sufficient reasons.47 The justifying 
reason, in turn, must be one that is allowed by a set of principles for the 
regulation of the interactions among persons that no one could reasonably 
reject.48 However, as John Rawls observes in Political Liberalism, a basic 
fact of modern life is reasonable disagreement. This disagreement arises 
from conflicts among basic values, the irreducibly different perspectives 
from which people view the world and understand the nature and end of 
human existence, about the weight and priority of various competing 
values and empirical uncertainty.49 We, therefore, appear to be in a 
predicament. We owe reasons to those who are affected by our actions, but 
there is such a diversity of reasons that it seems impossible to give a 
justification that others cannot reasonably reject. Enter the law. 
As Scott Shapiro has argued, positive law has a moral aim. A 
community faces a moral problem when its members desire to engage in 
cooperation, private ordering, and other modes of planning but are 
prevented from doing so by pluralism and disagreement, as well as the 
complexity of the issues that need to be addressed. To put it in the terms 
of the preceding paragraph, members of a community acknowledge the 
obligation of mutual respect but find it difficult to give reasons that others 
can accept. Some means are therefore required not only to coordinate 
disagreement (that is a very thin basis for mutual respect) but to serve as a 
 
45. Woolley, supra note 20, at 327.  
46. See David Luban & W. Bradley Wendel, Philosophical Legal Ethics: An 
Affectionate History, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 337, 352–55 (2017) (describing 
characteristics of Second Wave legal ethics theory).  
47. See Darwall, supra note 2, at 21–22, 74–77; see also Evan Fox-Decent, The 
Fiduciary Nature of State Authority, 31 QUEEN’S L.J. 259, 262 (2005) (arguing that the 
fiduciary relationship fundamentally arises from the rights-bearing nature of the subject of 
authority). 
48. See SCANLON, supra note 9, at 153–55; see also ONORA O’NEILL, CONSTRUCTING 
AUTHORITIES: REASON, POLITICS AND INTERPRETATION IN KANT’S PHILOSOPHY 13, 28 
(2015) (arguing that justified actions are based on reasons we can share). 
49. See RAWLS, supra note 44, at 55–57. 
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means of acknowledging others’ second-personal claims of authority. The 
law has the moral aim of rectifying the moral deficiencies of a community 
beset with uncertainty and disagreement. It does so by providing the 
resources that enable citizens of a community to make and enforce binding 
commitments to one another. To provide leverage out of the “circumstance 
of legality,”50 the law must settle normative controversy by guiding 
conduct through authoritative norms, in the name of the community as a 
whole, the content of which can be determined without going back to the 
considerations about which people disagreed in the first place.51 It follows 
from this functional account of the moral attractiveness of a democratic 
legal system and the rule of law that lawyers should not undermine the 
“strategy by which we secure community between people profoundly 
divided by reasonable but incompatible views of the good.”52 
Importantly, the law aims not only to resolve conflict, settle disputes, 
and provide a social plan,53 but to do so in a way that respects the capacity 
of those subject to the law for understanding and rational self-governance. 
Woolley follows Jeremy Waldron in contending that “governance through 
law, as opposed to governance by command or fiat, necessarily and 
essentially incorporates an attitude of respect for the dignity, rationality, 
and autonomy of those to whom it applies.”54 As Waldron has argued, the 
opposite of legality is not only tyranny but also capriciousness. What 
connects the ideal of the rule of law with ethical conceptions of human 
dignity is the assumption that we are all rational agents who can 
understand and act upon reasons.55 This implies that anyone who acts in a 
way that interferes with our interests owes us a reason. If this sounds 
familiar, it is because Waldron is working with the same deeply Kantian 
insight as Darwall, Scanlon, Korsgaard, and other moral philosophers who 
ground moral duties in mutual recognition of rational agency. Woolley 
locates the core of the lawyer’s ethical role in the way in which the 
fiduciary relationship empowers clients to act as autonomous moral agents 
in the context of a technically complex, legalized public order: 
The lawyer’s authority in relation to the client is the authority of 
enablement, of offering the knowledge, expertise, judgment, and skill 
 
50. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 170–73.  
51. Id. at 201–03, 398 (“[T]he logic of planning is respected only when the process 
of legal interpretation does not unsettle those questions that the law aims to settle.”). 
52. DARE, supra note 12, at 74.  
53. See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 1. 
54. Woolley, supra note 20, at 328–29 (discussing Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and 
the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 5, 55–56 (2008)).  
55. Waldron, supra note 1, at 27–28.  
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needed to permit the client to decide how to proceed and how to execute 
her decision.56  
I think this is right and would differ only in emphasis. Not only does 
the lawyer facilitate the client’s exercise of autonomous moral agency in 
making decisions about what to do; the lawyer also participates in giving 
the types of reasons that will suffice to justify the lawyer’s actions that 
have an impact on the interests of others. The law is a reason-giving 
practice, just like the kind of second-personal moral accountability 
envisioned by Darwall.57 The difference is that the law creates the 
possibility of a distinctive type of justification offered by the client, in 
which the lawyer’s services are generally necessary to enable the client to 
exercise the capacity of giving the relevant reasons. 
The specifically fiduciary element of this conception of legal ethics 
relies on anti-paternalism considerations.58 It is anti-paternalist in its 
rejection of the Nineteenth Century conception of professions as guardians 
of the public interest, and thus lawyers are entitled to refuse to assist their 
clients in undertakings that are contrary to the public interest. If it is the 
case that people may disagree reasonably about the weight and priority of 
competing values, then the lawyer has no greater claim than the client to 
moral rectitude. The lawyer may disagree with her client’s objectives but, 
leaving aside the cases of “Nazis and nutters” (to quote Tim Dare),59 a 
great deal of disagreement is likely to be in good faith. A lawyer is always 
free to attempt to sway the client to her own point of view, provided that 
she does not coerce or deceive the client in the process. When all is said 
and done, however, if competing views about the right course of action 
remain, one party’s view must prevail. The agency structure of the lawyer-
client relationship, where the lawyer’s role is to provide competent, 
technical assistance in pursuit of the client’s chosen objectives, entails that 
the client’s view must have priority. The traditional Nineteenth Century 
conception of professionalism held that the legal profession must serve as 
a repository of civic virtue in order to avoid a collapse into a kind of war 
of all against all, with all members of society limiting the aggressive 
pursuit of their self-interest only to the extent the state is able to stop them 
through the use of force.60 The standard conception of legal ethics 
 
56. Woolley, supra note 20, at 329.  
57. See DARWALL, supra note 2. 
58. See Luban, supra note 14, at 454. 
59. DARE, supra note 12, at 60. 
60. See generally KRONMAN, supra note 41 ; Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers Can’t 
Just Be Hired Guns, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND 
REGULATION 46 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000); Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America’s 
Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the 
American Lawyer’s Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381 (2001); Thomas L. Shaffer, 
Legal Ethics and the Good Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 319 (1987); ALEXIS DE 
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assumes, by contrast, that the requirements of civic virtue are themselves 
contestable and that lawyers are no better positioned than their clients to 
determine what is in the public interest.61  
The principle of non-accountability is thus shown to be derivable 
from the structure of the fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client, 
which in turn is derived from liberal political premises. An important 
aspect of the client’s capacity is to deliberate and act on reasons. Some of 
those reasons may involve technical questions related to the legal 
permissibility of a proposed course of action or, retroactively, something 
that the client has already done. The assistance of a trained expert is often 
necessary to facilitate the client’s capacity to include legal considerations 
in deliberation. When it comes to moral matters, however, including the 
effect of a lawful course of conduct on the interests of third parties, lawyers 
generally have no greater expertise than the client. They do not facilitate 
the client’s capacity for deliberation by acting on their own views about 
rights, values, or justice. In a sense, the lawyer-client fiduciary relationship 
disaggregates the client’s capacity for making fully-informed judgments 
and assigns responsibility to the lawyer to apply specialized professional 
knowledge related to the legal status of the client’s actions. It leaves 
ultimate responsibility for the all-things-considered moral judgment where 
it belongs: with the client. 
The lawyer’s non-accountability is not puzzling if it is understood as 
an implication of the design of a political system that allocates rights and 
duties under positive law, which requires expert assistance to understand 
and apply, but which also recognizes as a side-constraint the aim of not 
interfering with the autonomy of those subject to state authority.62 A 
lawyer does owe reasons to those affected by her client’s actions. The 
scope of those reasons, however, are restricted under the assumptions of 
liberal political theory. A liberal account would maintain that the 
assistance of lawyers is necessary so that clients may exercise responsible 
moral agency against the background of normative and empirical 
controversy. The role of the legal profession must be understood in 
relationship to the framework of legal rights and obligations that have been 
established by a political process. The process, in turn, must be understood 
 
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 263-68 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., 
Doubleday 1969) (1835); CHARLES-LOUIS DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE 
LAWS § 4.5 (Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Press 1949) (1748).  
61. See, e.g., Roiphe, supra note 44, at 649, 665, 668, 672–75 (arguing that one 
significant cause of the decline of the Nineteenth Century conception of professionalism is 
a broader societal loss of faith in the existence or knowability of the common good, the 
public interest, or the general will, to which lawyers as professionals have privileged 
access).  
62. See generally Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, 
A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613. 
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as having the function of settling disagreement and establishing a scheme 
of norms which citizens can employ to account for themselves when 
affecting the interests of others. Non-accountability is also supported by 
the fiduciary structure of the lawyer-client relationship. The lawyer as 
agent for the client substitutively exercises the client’s capacity. That 
means in part being as much as possible a pass-through for the reasons the 
client would offer in justification of her actions, if she had the expertise to 
do so.63 If the lawyer did more than this—if the lawyer offered her own 
reasons to the affected third party—then the lawyer would be overstepping 
the bounds of her authority, understood in terms of the client’s exercise of 
her capacities.64  
By exempting lawyers from the demand that they offer reasons to 
those who are affected by the actions of their clients, the principle of non-
accountability helps ensure that lawyers will not refrain from providing 
assistance to clients with whom they disagree about matters of morality. 
Clients are owed competent professional advice when they contemplate a 
course of action that is lawful, but which raises moral concerns about 
which reasonable people may disagree. The lawyer should not override the 
client’s responsibility to deliberate about what must be done, all things 
considered. The legal permissibility of a course of action is one factor the 
client may take into account in deliberation, but it is not dispositive. There 
is still the question of whether the client ought, morally, to do or refrain 
from doing something. The lawyer may give moral advice and guidance 
to the client if requested, but should not interfere with autonomous, 
responsible decision-making by the client. If that means the lawyer is not 
to second-guess the client’s resolution of a moral question on which people 
may reasonably disagree, then this is as it should be.65 A lawyer who has 
such strong personal objections to her client’s objectives may withdraw 
from the representation,66 but by longstanding professional tradition, the 
lawyer’s representation of a client should not be understood as “an 
 
63. See MARKOVITS, supra note 2, at 92–98 (defending the lawyerly virtue of fidelity, 
understood here as expressing their clients’ point of view and not introducing their own 
opinions about their clients’ actions).  
64. There is an interesting example in a comment to the Third Restatement of Agency, 
involving a corporate manager who believes that it is socially desirable that fewer, rather 
than more, people smoke cigarettes. As it happens, however, the manager works for a 
tobacco company. (Maybe it’s time for the manager to dust off her resume . . .) The 
manager exploits an ambiguity in the instructions of a corporate superior to redirect 
advertising expenditures in a way that will lessen overall demand for cigarettes. The 
Restatement concludes (rightly, in my view) that the manager breached her fiduciary duty 
to the corporation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e, illus. 1 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2006).  
65. DARE, supra note 12, at 75.  
66. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). 
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endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social, or moral views.”67 
The argument of the preceding section shows why this aspect of 
professional tradition is consistent with the agency and fiduciary structure 
of the lawyer-client relationship.  
In most cases, a lawyer can assume that the client has exercised his, 
her, or its (for organizational clients) capacity to engage in reasoning. If 
the lawyer then acts in a way that facilitates the client’s capacity, by 
advising the client on the requirements of the law and offering reasons that 
refer to the client’s legal entitlements to those affected by the client’s 
actions, the lawyer is not morally accountable for anything the client does 
that harms others. There may be occasions, however, when the client is 
behaving capriciously or otherwise not exhibiting the capacity essential to 
moral agency. If that is the case, then the earlier concern resurfaces. The 
lawyer-client relationship would in fact be an amoral domain, as opposed 
to a moral division of labor, if the client has not acted as a responsible 
moral agent in determining the objectives of the professional 
representation. The following section considers what happens when this 
assumption does not hold.  
III.   DYSFUNCTION IN THE MORAL DIVISION OF LABOR 
A. Lawyers for a Badly-Run Corporation 
Lawyers representing organizational clients may encounter a 
situation in which the client—acting through its directors and officers—
seems bent on moral, but not legal, wrongdoing. For the time being, I 
would like to bracket the issue of whether corporations may be treated as 
moral agents, on which there is a voluminous literature.68 Rather, the 
analysis here will proceed on the assumptions of basic corporate law, 
 
67. Id. at r. 1.2(b).  
68. See generally Ian Ashley & Diana Winstanley, For or Against Corporate 
Identity? Personification and the Problem of Moral Agency, 76 J. BUS. ETHICS 83 (2007); 
Matthew C. Altman, The Decomposition of the Corporate Body: What Kant Cannot 
Contribute to Business Ethics, 74 J. BUS. ETHICS 253 (2007); Manuel Velasquez, 
Debunking Corporate Moral Responsibility, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 531 (2003); Raymond S. 
Pfeiffer, The Central Distinction in the Theory of Corporate Moral Personhood, 9 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 473 (1990); Kenneth E. Goodpaster & John B. Matthews, Jr., Can a Corporation 
Have a Conscience?, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 1982, at 132; John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to 
Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate 
Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981); Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral 
Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207 (1979). I am also not considering the different, and extremely 
interesting, issue of whether autonomous systems can function as entities, particularly 
using an LLC form, and thus be the clients of human (or machine) lawyers. See generally 
Lynn M. LoPuckii, Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2018); Shawn Bayern, 
The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous 
Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93 (2015). Thanks to James Grimmelman for alerting me 
to this development in technology.  
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namely that shareholders elect directors who have a fiduciary duty to 
shareholders and to the corporate entity; that officers manage the day-to-
day affairs of the corporation and similarly have fiduciary duties to the 
corporate entity. The ethical analysis does not depend on the corporation 
having an identity analogous to that of a human moral agent, with the 
capacity to give reasons and issue demands for accountability. It is instead, 
by analogy, a kind of moral nexus-of-contracts idea in which the 
corporation is simply an abstract way of talking about the duties owed by 
human beings to each other, albeit in virtue of other obligations and 
expectations created by others acting with reference to the abstract idea of 
the corporation. In this moral nexus-of-contracts way of looking at the 
representation of corporate clients the ethical issue facing lawyers is what 
they owe, as moral agents, both to their client and to third parties who may 
be affected by their client’s actions.  
In their book on legal ethics in Australia, Christine Parker and Adrian 
Evans give an example, called “Lawyers, Gunns and Protest,”69 involving 
Gunns Ltd., a timber company facing protests from environmental 
activists opposed to its clearcutting of old-growth forests.70 Modifying 
their example slightly, imagine that some officers of the corporation have 
suggested taking legal action against environmental groups engaging in 
actions such as disrupting logging operations, attempting to persuade 
consumers to avoid Gunns’s products, and pressuring institutional 
shareholders to vote for board members who would restrict clearcutting. 
Some of the legal actions, particularly those targeted at activists engaged 
in disruption, could impose significant costs on critics of the company. 
Imagine a decision-making process in which corporate officers, in-house 
lawyers, and outside (retained) law firms were involved. There is nothing 
preventing lawyers from raising objections on ethical grounds (or any 
other grounds, such as public relations) to the company proceeding against 
the environmental activists.71 Parker and Evans suggest raising 
considerations such as the identity of interested stakeholders, the interests 
and values at stake, and how those interests and values may conflict.72 The 
corporate officers empowered to make a final decision on behalf of Gunns 
may agree with the advice and seek a more cooperative relationship with 
critics of the company. Or, they may decide to fight like hell. Parker and 
Evans imagine the executive chairman stating that he is “sick and tired of 
 
69. Appreciation for the Warren Zevon allusion. 
70. See CHRISTINE PARKER & ADRIAN EVANS, INSIDE LAWYERS’ ETHICS 7–14 (2007).  
71. Under the U.S. law governing lawyers, there is an express permission for lawyers 
to refer to “moral, economic, social and political factors” that may bear on the client’s 
decision, when rendering advice. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2003).  
72. PARKER & EVANS, supra note 70, at 10. 
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the misleading information being peddled about our industry and our 
state” and demanding assistance to put a stop to “unauthorised entry to 
private property and damage to equipment owned by Gunns Limited.”73 If 
that is a decision reached by a responsible (legal) agent for the corporation, 
then the lawyer, also an agent for the corporation, must accept that 
instruction from the client as long as there is a sufficient basis in law and 
fact for doing so. 
I want to suggest, however, that underlying this normative division 
of labor is an assumption that someone—whether high-ranking officers of 
the company, its board of directors, or corporate officers and directors 
consulting with lawyers and other professional advisors—has conducted 
something approximating the holistic moral evaluation recommended by 
Parker and Evans. Although they do not use this terminology, Parker and 
Evans have set out the prerequisites for regarding any client as a moral 
agent. A lawyer who elects to accept instructions from the company’s 
management to use legal processes to push back against the environmental 
activists might reason as follows: “[r]easonable people can disagree about 
the issues posed by my client’s activities. Clearcutting old-growth forests 
may seem irresponsible, but from the forestry-management point of view 
there are some things to be said in favor of the practice. It allows more 
sunlight to reach new seedlings that require sunny conditions to thrive. It 
is also quite a bit less expensive than other harvesting methods. On the 
other hand, clearcuts look ugly and disrupt the habitat of forest wildlife. 
The environmental activists have some good points, but so does my client. 
And while it’s true that the company’s critics should be allowed to protest 
peacefully, their rights to free expression do not entitle them to destroy my 
client’s property or inflict unjustified economic harms. The law provides 
a mechanism for balancing the environmental issues related to clearcutting 
practices as well as the rights implicated by the protests.”  
This inner monologue may be fanciful and a bit romanticized, but the 
point should be clear: If reasonable people could reach differing 
conclusions about a moral issue, and there are legal processes available for 
settling and reaching a social position on what is to be done in the face of 
this disagreement, then lawyers participate in a morally valuable social 
practice when they act as (legal) agents on behalf of clients. This structure 
of authority and accountability for lawyers presupposes, however, that the 
client has settled on a course of action that is adequately supported by 
reasons of the right sort. 
Consider a real-life example of corporate decision-making that 
differs from the idealized reasoning in the Gunns example. As detailed in 
 
73. Id. 
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a report by an outside law firm,74 management and inside counsel for 
General Motors (G.M.) badly bungled the investigation of a significant 
risk to public safety. As extensively reported, a faulty ignition switch used 
in several G.M. cars, including the Chevrolet Cobalt and Saturn Ion, would 
sometimes fail in a way that both shut off the engine and disabled the car’s 
airbags.75 The switch departed from its intended design in a crucial 
respect–the torque was less than specified so that if a driver inadvertently 
bumped into it, or if the keys hanging from the ignition switch were too 
heavy, the electrical system might change from “run” to “accessory” 
mode. As early as 2005, G.M. started to receive reports of crashes in which 
the car’s airbags failed to deploy. At first, they did not suspect a problem, 
as there were other factors that might have caused the airbags to fail to 
deploy. It was also hard to track down the problem because the engineer 
who had approved the original, faulty switch also approved a change to 
the switch design that solved the problem, but did so in a way that obscured 
the original risk.76 But, by about 2007, it was becoming clear that there 
might be a defect in the electrical system of certain car lines. Finally, in 
early 2014, G.M. publicly disclosed the defect, began recalling as many as 
2.6 million cars, and established a compensation fund for the victims of 
switch-related accidents. 
What happened between 2007 and 2014? The long and short of it is, 
evidence of a possible defect was fed into the machinery of a cumbersome, 
bureaucratic process that churned on and on without moving toward a 
resolution. G.M. had a byzantine structure of review programs, tracking 
systems, and cross-disciplinary committees that was created precisely to 
detect and rectify issues like the ignition switch defect.77 Customer 
satisfaction issues, which came to the attention of G.M. personnel involved 
in marketing, were supposed to get directed to engineers for improvement, 
coded for whether the problems were a mere annoyance or a possible 
 
74. ANTON R. VALUKAS, JENNER & BLOCK, REPORT TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF 
GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY REGARDING IGNITION SWITCH RECALLS (2014), 
https://bit.ly/3194mK3 [hereinafter VALUKAS REPORT]. But see BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR., THE 
INSIDE COUNSEL REVOLUTION 96–99 (2016) (criticizing the Valukas Report for failing to 
ascribe responsibility to top executives). 
75. See Hilary Stout, After a G.M. Recall, a Fiery Crash and a Payout, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 25, 2014), https://nyti.ms/2M33LpG; Hilary Stout et al., For a Decade, G.M. 
Response to a Fatal Flaw Was to Shrug, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2014), 
https://nyti.ms/2K4Uxqx; Rebecca R. Ruiz et al., 13 Deaths, Untold Heartache, From 
G.M. Defect, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2014), https://nyti.ms/2QoX9k8.  
76. See VALUKAS REPORT, supra note 74, at 53 (describing design release engineer 
Raymond DiGiorgio’s decision to approve the original switch), 98–101 (recounting 
DiGiorgio’s change to switch without making change to the part number, which G.M. CEO 
Mary Barra characterized as a violation of “Engineering 101” standards). 
77. Id. app. B at 282–91 (summarizing systems maintained in connection with G.M. 
engineering and product development process, internal investigation, and products liability 
claims). 
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safety concern.78 Managers from divisions of products, systems, and safety 
engineering periodically met with business managers to work on solutions 
to safety problems and overcome roadblocks.79 Additional committees 
dealt with problems manifesting themselves in the field and had contact 
with representatives from engineering, marketing, business, and legal 
teams.80 Reading the description of these procedures and protocols, one 
comes away with the impression of a company that takes its obligations to 
customers quite seriously. In reality, however, the redundancy and 
ambiguity inherent in the structure sapped the energy from the company’s 
response. With multiple committees dealing with various aspects of the 
same problem, no person or centralized team had responsibility for making 
sure something got done. CEO Mary Barra memorably testified before 
Congress about the “G.M. nod,” when everyone in the room agrees with a 
proposed plan of action, but no one does anything to make it happen, and 
the “G.M. salute,” which consists of crossed arms with fingers pointing 
toward others, to whom responsibility is being punted.81 The human cost 
of this dithering can be measured in the injuries and deaths that would have 
been prevented if prompt corrective action had been taken.82 
Revelations of corporate wrongdoing are inevitably followed by the 
question, memorably asked by a federal judge surveying the wreckage of 
the savings and loan industry in the late 1980s, “where were the lawyers?” 
Judge Stanley Sporkin demanded to know, “[w]here were these 
professionals . . . when these clearly improper transactions were being 
consummated?”83 Although the nature of G.M.’s wrongdoing was 
negligence and inaction, as opposed to willful frauds, Judge Sporkin’s 
question is still the right one to ask. The answer turns out to be that lawyers 
were involved in the process of responding to reports of defects in the 
ignition switch, but they did not do enough. After the dust settled, many 
of those lawyers were fired for their inaction.84  
 
78. Id. app. B at 283 (describing Product Resolution Tracking System). 
79. Id. app. B at 286 (describing Vehicle and Process Integration Review). 
80. Id. app. B at 289–90 (describing Field Performance Evaluation and Product 
Investigation processes).  
81. See Peter J. Henning, How G.M.’s Lawyers Failed in Their Duties, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 9, 2014), https://nyti.ms/2weJBOL. Barra’s candid testimony about the dysfunctions 
within the G.M. organization is an ironic counterexample to Max Weber’s theory of 
bureaucratic organizations, which emphasizes their capacity for carrying out complex tasks 
with “[p]recision, speed, unambiguity, . . . continuity, discretion, unity, strict 
subordination, [and] reduction of friction and of material and personal costs.” See MAX 
WEBER, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER:  ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 214 (H. H. Gerth & 
C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946). 
82. See HEINEMAN, supra note 75, at 96 (citing report by Kenneth Feinberg, 
concluding that 124 people had died in connection with the ignition switch defect).  
83. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990). 
84. See Sue Reisinger, GM In-house Lawyers ‘Removed’ in Ignition-Switch Purge, 
CORPORATE COUNSEL (June 9, 2014; 3:40 P.M.), https://bit.ly/2HN2GwL. 
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Significantly, the Valukas report did not conclude that the in-house 
lawyers were assisting in a cover-up. Attorneys familiar with products 
liability cases pending against G.M. asked why the company had not 
ordered a recall and were told that the engineering department was 
“acutely aware” of the issue and was doing everything they could.85 Yet 
CEO Barra said that the lawyers “didn’t take responsibility; didn’t act with 
any sense of urgency.”86 In particular, the company’s lawyers dealt with 
the ignition switch problems as “business as usual,” without alerting G.M. 
general counsel. One might object that it is unfair to blame the lawyers for 
what is, after all, a not uncommon problem of organizational dysfunction. 
While not exonerating individual decision-makers, many after-the-fact 
reports on corporate wrongdoing focus on structural explanations such as 
diffusion of responsibility, groupthink, and pluralistic ignorance.87 Unlike 
the players in many of these cases, however, the lawyers for G.M. were 
not relatively powerless underlings, dependent for their professional 
survival on a “Godfather” or protector higher in the corporate chain of 
command.88 They were highly experienced, trusted by senior management, 
and in some cases in charge of the committees that made decisions about 
product recalls. These lawyers were in as good a position as lawyers can 
be to participate in deliberation about how the company ought to proceed. 
Instead, however, they in effect surrendered to the bureaucratic 
imperatives of a reporting structure that left no one in charge. That was a 
professional failing, not least of all in terms of the duties they owed to their 
client, the corporation, to protect it against the monetary and reputational 
costs of a fiasco such as the one that occurred at G.M. 
What does this have to do with fiduciary theory? Again, I am not 
trying to make the point that it is appropriate to treat corporations on par 
with natural-person moral agents for purposes of ascribing responsibility 
and blame. Perhaps some association of human beings can be treated as 
metaphysical persons, but the claim here does not depend on the 
interdependence of metaphysical and ethical personhood.89 Cases such as 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Store, Inc.90 and Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission91 show that, for some juridical purposes, it is 
 
85. VALUKAS REPORT, supra note 75, at 184. 
86. Reisinger, supra note 84. 
87. See generally, MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY 
WE FAIL TO DO WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2011); DIANA VAUGHAN, THE 
CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, AND DEVIANCE AT NASA 
(1996). 
88. Compare the stories of ethical decision-making by middle managers in ROBERT 
JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988).  
89. See French, supra note 68.  
90. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
91. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
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appropriate to treat a corporation as a person. As a matter of corporate and 
agency law, a corporation is an entity to which fiduciary duties are owed, 
by natural-person agents, including officers and lawyers.92 The important 
point, however, is that treating a corporation as a person can be understood 
as nothing more than protecting the legal rights of the natural persons who 
have legal relationships, through the corporation, with other persons or the 
state.93 (That is what is meant by the “moral nexus-of-contracts” view 
alluded to, above.) Nothing turns on the equivalence of natural-person 
capacity and artificial-person capacity. The relevant capacities here are 
those of human moral agents, understood along Kantian lines, as being 
able to respond and comply with reasonable demands including the 
demands of others for accountability.94  
The important thing from the standpoint of ethical theory is that, in 
order for a corporation to serve as a vehicle for the realization of human 
capacities, it must respond to them or embody them in appropriate ways. 
The plaintiffs in the Hobby Lobby case asserted that they believed 
themselves to be under an obligation to run their businesses in accordance 
with their religious commitments.95 If compliance with that directive had 
somehow broken down in the course of day-to-day operations, the 
corporate form would have failed to facilitate the capacity of the human 
owners of the business to exercise their religious beliefs. This could occur 
through intentional subversion by lower-level employees or some 
unintentional failure to communicate a policy to employees tasked with 
 
92. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c, e (AM. LAW INST. 2006) 
(alluding to the importance of fiduciary doctrines in simplifying the process of making and 
communicating decisions for organizational principals).  
93. The Supreme Court in the Hobby Lobby case understood the purpose of the legal 
fiction of corporate personhood as protecting the rights—in this case, the religious liberty 
interests—of humans who interact with others through the vehicle of a legally constitute 
entity:  
[I]t is important to keep in mind that the purpose of this fiction is to provide 
protection for human beings. A corporation is simply a form of organization used 
by human beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law specifies 
the rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and 
employees) who are associated with a corporation in one way or another. When 
rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the 
purpose is to protect the rights of these people. 
Burwell, 573 U.S. at 706–07. Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, contends that the exercise of 
religion is characteristic of natural persons, not juridical entities. See id. at 794 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting). That is true as far as it goes, but not responsive to the majority’s argument 
that natural persons can exercise their human capacities through associations, including 
for-profit corporations. In other words, the moral nexus-of-contracts view adopted here 
may be a sufficient response to Justice Ginsburg.  
94. See DARWALL, supra note 2, at 115–17. 
95. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2764–66.  
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complying with it.96 In a large corporation like G.M., the risk to the core 
value of product safety could arise from the operation of many of the basic 
functional units of the business, “from finance to sales to marketing to 
manufacturing to technology development to sourcing.”97 It is unrealistic 
to expect that the product of the management and decision-making 
systems of a complex organization will resemble the directive of a single 
natural-person agent. Many corporate and other organizational scandals, 
including the G.M. ignition switch failure, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig 
explosion and environmental disaster,98 the space shuttle Challenger 
launch decision,99 and the cheating by Volkswagen on emissions testing,100 
involve exceedingly complicated cultural and organizational failures, the 
significance of which is sometimes apparent only in hindsight. 
The response to this observation should not be to deny that corporate 
principals have capacity that their agents may exercise. In most cases, a 
lawyer can assume that instructions from a corporate client represent the 
conclusion of a rational decision-making process. However, there may be 
circumstances that raise red flags, suggesting a fundamental failure of the 
organizational form to express the capacities of the humans who act 
through the legal entity. The G.M. ignition switch case is a good example 
because it should have been clear to lawyers for the corporation that 
something had gone deeply wrong with regard to a central value of the 
corporation. 
[A communication breakdown] is surely no defense for the General 
Counsel when the legal function is right at the core of the problem – with 
responsibility to determine if there is real liability due to design or 
manufacturing defects; to confront ethical issues about when the 
company should act to protect people, even though liability questions are 
not fully resolved; to push the organization to understand open technical 
issues; and to resolve them with all deliberate speed.101  
In extraordinary cases of a breakdown in rational decision-making 
within a corporation, a lawyer may be obligated to take more direct 
responsibility for the client’s compliance with legal and ethical 
responsibilities. Remember that the lawyer’s usual lack of accountability 
 
96. Picking up on the facts of a case underlying the result in Hobby Lobby, imagine a 
manager’s failure to understand that the owner’s instruction to close the business on the 
Sabbath meant the Jewish Sabbath, Saturday. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 
(1961).  
97. HEINEMAN, supra note 75, at 145. 
98. See generally EARL BOEBERT & JAMES M. BLOSSOM, DEEPWATER HORIZON: A 
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF THE MACONDO DISASTER (2016). 
99. VAUGHAN, supra note 83.  
100. E.g., Roger Parloff, How VW Paid $25 Billion for “Dieselgate” – and Got Off 
Easy, FORTUNE (Feb. 6, 2018), https://bit.ly/2SgrUHn. 
101. HEINEMAN, supra note 75, at 98. 
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is premised on a normative division of labor between the lawyer and the 
client. This division of labor presupposes reasonableness on the part of the 
client. Lawyers should not be too quick to second-guess their clients’ 
decisions or to label them as unreasonable, but if the facts warrant a 
reasonable belief on the part of the lawyer that the client is not acting to 
make reasonable decisions, the lawyer cannot rely on the usual allocation 
of decision-making authority. To be clear, the ethical failing here harmed 
G.M. first and foremost. Its lawyers were primarily obligated to protect it 
from the liability and reputational damage the company incurred. To the 
extent G.M. as a corporate person was also bound to act with due regard 
for the interests of others, however, the lawyers’ failing also caused harm 
to customers. The lawyers’ greater responsibility was primarily to the 
client, but derivatively to those with whom the client stood in a 
relationship of accountability.  
Legal profession scholar David Wilkins has argued that the agency 
model is not the best description of the relationship between large, 
sophisticated corporate clients and their outside counsel; the relationship 
would be better understood as a kind of partnership or strategic alliance.102 
The key difference between the agency model criticized by Wilkins and 
the idea of a partnership or strategic alliance is that neither party in the 
latter form of relationship has sufficient power to dominate the other. The 
result is the emergence of a new “logic of embeddedness,” which 
emphasizes trust and reciprocity in an ongoing relationship.103 Doctrinally, 
the logic of embeddedness is consistent with the duties of partners as 
mutual agents for one another.104 However, it seems to fit uneasily with 
the American law of lawyering, as well as Woolley’s account of lawyers 
as fiduciaries, both of which emphasize a kind one-way transmittal of 
instructions from client to lawyer.105 The lawyer’s legal duty is to act 
competently and diligently, in a manner reasonably calculated to advance 
the client’s lawful objectives, as the client defines them.106 As Wilkins 
points out, however, the logic of embeddedness may only reorient the 
dynamics of the lawyer-client relationship, rather than altering its 
fundamental character.107 In particular, a long-term strategic partnership 
gives both parties an incentive to look out for each other’s health and 
 
102. David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate 
Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2070 (2010).  
103. Id. at 2071.  
104. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 271 
(3d ed. 2001).  
105. See supra notes 31–38, and accompanying text.  
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16(1)–(2) (AM. 
LAW INST. 2000).  
107. See Wilkins, supra note 102, at 2114.  
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viability.108 This means that the role of outside lawyers may include 
maintaining a corporate client’s core values.109  
Corporate officers may welcome a lawyer’s advice concerning the 
corporation’s core values. State rules of professional conduct permit 
lawyers to offer non-legal advice,110 and there is a longstanding 
professional tradition of outside lawyers acting as “wise counselor[s]” to 
their clients.111 One should not get carried away with the idea of a strategic 
partnership between lawyers and clients, because the ultimate 
responsibility to take care of the corporation’s core values belongs to its 
directors and officers.112 In most cases, lawyers can rely on those 
authorized constituents to discern and articulate the organization’s values 
and objectives. Where there is a clear failure of intra-organization 
decision-making processes, however, lawyers may have a role to play in 
ensuring that the corporate structure does not interfere with the 
relationship of accountability that lies behind the legal duties owed by the 
corporation to others. 
B. Government Lawyers for a Capricious Executive 
The argument in this section begins with a hypothetical. Imagine that 
you are a career lawyer in the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Antitrust 
Division, at a fairly senior level, reporting to the politically appointed head 
of the Division. The Division head instructs you to explore legal theories 
for opposing the pending merger between AT&T and Time Warner. You 
are surprised, given a long history of a fairly deferential approach by the 
Justice Department toward so-called “vertical mergers” among 
“upstream” suppliers of a product and “downstream” distributors.113 A 
good bit of established law supports the position that vertical mergers can 
actually increase competition among firms – creating efficiencies by 
cutting sales and distribution costs and enhancing the flow of information. 
AT&T and Time Warner argue that their merger will help the new 
company compete more effectively against Netflix, Amazon, Apple, and 
Google, who are making substantial investments in video content and 
distribution. This is not necessarily a decisive argument, and the Justice 
Department has occasionally opposed vertical mergers. But you think 
there must be something else going on. 
 
108. Id. at 2115.  
109. Id. at 2117.  
110. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003). 
111. See Robert A. Kagan & Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large 
Law Firm Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 399, 424 n. 30 (1985). 
112. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003). 
113. See, e.g., John Salett, The Interesting Case of the Vertical Merger, U.S. DEP’T 
JUSTICE (Nov. 17, 2016), https://bit.ly/2EUiBJ5. 
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You realize that Time Warner owns CNN, which has been a frequent 
target of Trump’s tweets alleging it is a purveyor of fake news.114 As 
reported in Politico, Justice Department lawyers had warned the 
companies that the government would seek to prevent the merger unless 
Time Warner sold CNN.115 The current head of DOJ-Antitrust, Makan 
Delrahim, said in 2016 that he did not see any major obstacles to the 
merger . . . before he assumed his current position.116 And Republican 
presidents have typically been very accommodating toward large 
corporate mergers, particularly those among companies that do not 
compete directly with each other. Considering that President Trump has 
also periodically threatened some unspecified antitrust or tax enforcement 
action against Amazon, because its owner, Jeff Bezos, also owns the 
Washington Post,117 it’s hard to believe that President Trump’s 
longstanding feud with CNN did not play some role in his administration’s 
decision to oppose the merger. You have a nagging suspicion that your 
legal work will be used to further President Trump’s vendetta against 
CNN, rather than assisting with an impartial analysis of whether the 
merger is in the public interest. What do you do?  
 
114. As an example, Trump said he was  “forced” to watch CNN while in the 
Philippines and “again realized how bad, and FAKE, it is. Loser!” See, e.g., John Bowden, 
Trump, back from Asia, knocks “loser,” THE HILL (Nov. 15, 2017, 7:18 AM), 
https://bit.ly/2EmmUN0. 
115. Steven Overly & Josh Gerstein, Trump administration sues to block AT&T-Time 
Warner merger, POLITICO (Nov. 20, 2017, 3:51 PM), https://politi.co/2zUHbYU. 
116. See, e.g., Celia Kang, AT&T deal puts Trump’s antitrust cop at center of a 
political storm, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2zvWqoz. 
117. Paul Farhi, ‘Not an appropriate way for a presidential candidate to behave’: 
Bezos fires back at Donald Trump, WASH. POST (May 18, 2016), https://wapo.st/2whyJ2s. 
Trump continued to refer to the paper as the “Amazon Washington Post” months after 
taking office. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, This Column Brought to You by the “Amazon 
Washington Post,” WASH. POST (July 25, 2017), https://wapo.st/2ESAsAe. Some 
administration officials have stated that Trump’s attacks on Amazon often are in response 
to negative coverage in the Washington Post. See Damian Paletta & Josh Dawsey, Trump 
personally pushed postmaster general to double rates on Amazon, other firms, WASH. POST 
(May 18, 2018), https://wapo.st/2Jys2SD. During the presidential election campaign 
Trump threatened unspecified “problems” for Amazon and owner Jeff Bezos if he became 
President:  
“He owns Amazon,” Mr. Trump said in February. “He wants political influence 
so Amazon will benefit from it. That’s not right. And believe me, if I become 
president, oh do they have problems. They’re going to have such problems.” 
Adam Liptak, Donald Trump Could Threaten U.S. Rule of Law, Scholars Say, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 3, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2QjDFNv. In May 2018 it was reported that Trump 
instructed U.S. Postmaster General Megan Brennan to double the rate it charges Amazon 
for “last mile” package deliveries, notwithstanding a contractual agreement between 
Amazon and the Postal Service. See Emily Stewart, Trump’s trying to fight Amazon and 
Jeff Bezos from the White House, VOX (May 21, 2018; 11:06 AM), https://bit.ly/2wW5lCb.  
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It is sometimes asserted that government lawyers, unlike lawyers for 
private clients, have an obligation to serve the common good or pursue the 
public interest: 
It is an uncontroversial proposition in mainstream American legal 
thought that government lawyers have greater responsibilities to pursue 
the common good or the public interest than their counterparts in private 
practice, who represent non-governmental persons and entities.118  
However, in an influential article, Geoffrey Miller argues that 
government lawyers should not act on their own conception of the public 
interest, because the Constitution establishes a procedure for 
approximating the content of this ideal, through elections, political 
appointment of agency heads, and so on.119 Are vertical mergers, such as 
AT&T and Time Warner, in the public interest? The answer to that 
question relies to some degree on economics, on whether increased 
efficiencies will enhance Time Warner’s ability to compete against Netflix 
in the market for video content. One might expect variation in the views 
of political appointees in the DOJ Antitrust Division with respect to large 
corporate mergers, and for these variations to correspond to the president’s 
beliefs about social and economic policy. Some presidents might distrust 
the concentration of wealth and increased inequality that a large-scale 
merger might bring about or might oppose these mergers on the ground of 
their impact on workers and consumers. Other presidents might believe 
these concerns are outside the scope of antitrust policy or may believe 
mergers are beneficial to consumers in the long run.120 Resolving these 
sorts of disagreements is exactly, as Miller argued, what elections are for. 
To put Miller’s argument in terms of the analysis in this paper, democratic 
procedures are intended to establish a position that government officials 
advance, but the capacities in question are those of the polity as a whole, 
not the individual officials charged with giving effect to the results of the 
political process. Nevertheless, the result is to establish a normative 
division of labor between lawyers and clients, just as in the case of 
representing a corporation.  
 
118. Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will 
Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 789 (2000). 
119. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of 
Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293 (1987). 
120. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Goals of Antitrust: A 
Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 369–70 (1965) (“It is simply not accurate to 
say that Congress ever squarely decided to prefer the preservation of small business to the 
preservation of a free market in which the forces of competition were dominant. There was 
much oratory in Congress about the virtues of small business but no clear indication that 
antitrust should create shelters for the inefficient. . . . It would be hard to demonstrate that 
the independent druggist or groceryman is any more solid and virtuous a citizen than the 
local manager of a chain operation.”).  
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The hypothetical is structured around a lawyer serving in an advisory 
capacity, not taking a position in litigation on behalf of the government. 
One reason for this is to avoid the debate over Executive Branch 
constitutionalism – whether “judicial supremacy” or “departmentalism” is 
the best conception of the constitutional obligations of government 
officials.121 Features of the American Constitution suggest political branch 
interpretivism. For example, Article II, Section 3 states that the President 
“shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” (the Take Care 
Clause). Further, Article II Section 1, Clause 8 provides that the President 
shall take the following oath: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will 
faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to 
the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the 
United States.” Former Clinton and Obama Administration lawyer (now 
Dean of NYU Law School), Trevor Morrison, quotes John Marshall as 
recognizing that “a variety of legal questions must present themselves in 
the performance of every part of executive duty, but these questions are 
not therefore to be decided in court.”122 There are zones of non-
justiciability and also areas in which courts defer to the practices and 
understandings of the political branches. This is not a license for political 
officials to ignore the law, but rather it places responsibility on them to 
“go further and confront the Constitution themselves.”123 It is the province 
and duty of the political branches to say what the law of the Constitution 
is.124 Because government lawyers do not have an obligation to incorporate 
considerations of public interest in the advice they give to clients, and 
because courts defer to the political branches, it is particularly important 
that the prerequisites for a normative division of labor in the lawyer-client 
relationship be satisfied here.  
The issue in the hypothetical is what a lawyer should do when it 
appears that the President’s stated reasons—in this case, for opposing the 
 
121. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 172 (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On 
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1359–60 (1997); 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the 
Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221 (1994); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in 
Theory and Practice: Two Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics, 
83 GEO. L.J. 373, 373–74 (1994); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law 
and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 43 (1993); Thomas W. 
Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992); Walter F. 
Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 
REV. POLITICS 401 (1986). 
122. Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1695 
(2011). 
123. Id. at 1696. 
124. Id. at 1697. 
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AT&T and Time Warner merger—are not the actual reasons for the 
directive. It bears emphasizing that the answer is not that the lawyer should 
pursue her own conception of the common good or the public interest. The 
lawyer’s disagreement with the President’s policy objectives, or even her 
sincere beliefs that they are contrary to the public interest, is not a 
sufficient reason to refuse to assist the President (acting through political 
appointees) in accomplishing his objectives. But the President’s actions 
must be supportable by reasons, and given the notorious capriciousness of 
the current President,125 a government lawyer has a heightened duty to 
ensure that internal decision-making processes work properly. Democratic 
accountability and the rule of law are protected not only by the familiar 
separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches, but also by intra-branch structures that ensure a robust process 
of contestation preceding official policy-making.126 Our hypothetical 
lawyer at the DOJ Antitrust Division, therefore, has a duty of loyalty to 
ensure that the client engages in a reasoned process of deliberation.127 It 
 
125. As another example, consider Trump’s inconsistency regarding the so-called 
DREAMers – undocumented aliens brought to the United States as children. Trump ended 
the Obama Administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, 
creating a crisis for DREAMers. He then claimed he would support legislation to fix what 
he said were problems with the program, but then balked at the necessary compromises. 
He then threatened a veto of a bipartisan approach hammered out by Senate negotiators. 
See Ezra Klein, Saving DREAMers is only this hard because Donald Trump has made it 
this hard, VOX (Feb. 14, 2018; 8:40 AM), https://bit.ly/2EqALSK. 
126. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: 
An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 229 (2016); 
see generally Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in 
Federal Agencies, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 53 (2014); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, 
Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032 (2011); Gillian E. Metzger, The 
Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 
EMORY L.J. 423, 423–25 (2009); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: 
Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006); 
Cornelia Pillard, Unitariness and Myopia: The Executive Branch, Legal Process, and 
Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1297 (2006); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 2245 (2001). 
127. I have argued elsewhere, including in connection with the ethical obligations of 
government lawyers, that the rule of law is “a regulative ideal for an activity,” not a 
standard that makes reference to the content of a conclusion of law. See W. Bradley 
Wendel, Government Lawyers in the Trump Administration, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 275, 340 
(2017) (emphasis added). This insight is due ultimately to Lon Fuller, and to the way 
Fuller’s position has recently been developed by David Luban and Jeremy Waldron. See 
generally David Luban, Natural Law as Professional Ethics: A Reading of Fuller, in 
LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 99, 103 (Gerald Postema ed., 2007) (“Fuller 
characterizes natural law as a way of conducting a practical activity . . . rather than as a 
philosophical thesis about the truth conditions of a proposition of law”); WALDRON, supra 
note 44, at 6 (“Law is an exceedingly demanding discipline intellectually, and the idea that 
it could consist in the thoughtless administration of a set of operationalized rules with 
determinate meanings and clear fields of application is of course a travesty.”). There are 
comparable duties within other areas of law, such as corporate law, which “look not only 
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may be that the government’s opposition to the merger is supportable by 
adequate reasons.  
Here, it is difficult to escape the effect of hindsight bias. The district 
court considering the government’s lawsuit to block the merger found, 
after a lengthy trial, that the government had not met its burden to 
demonstrate that the transaction is likely to lessen competition 
substantially.128 Vertical mergers, such as this one, are widely believed to 
create efficiencies and therefore be “procompetitive.”129 The DOJ 
Antitrust Division had not brought a lawsuit to block a vertical merger in 
over forty years.130 The government, however, had plausible theories for 
the anti-competitive effect of the merger, including the increasing leverage 
that ownership of Turner networks (including CNN) would give AT&T 
over rival content providers who wished to use AT&T’s distribution 
network.131  
The problem for the lawyer is that there appears to be a disconnect 
between the President’s motivation for ordering the Justice Department to 
oppose the merger and the sufficiency of the reasons that could be 
marshaled in opposition to the merger.132 The district court denied 
discovery into communications between the White House and the head of 
the DOJ Antitrust Division, Delrahim, which were intended to show that 
the lawsuit was motivated by President Trump’s antipathy toward CNN.133 
For the purposes of this paper, the question is whether the lawyer’s role as 
a fiduciary of the client, understood as furthering the client’s capacities, is 
undermined by a mismatch between the client’s motives and reasons. Are 
reasons distinct from motives? In the case of lawyers as fiduciaries, the 
 
to fairness of ‘price,’ an inquiry into the agreed financial terms, but to fairness of ‘dealing.’” 
Andrew F. Tuch, Self-Dealing Revisited 10 (unpublished manuscript) at 10.  
128. See United States v. AT & T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 165 (D.D.C. 2018). 
129. Id. at 197–98. 
130. Jake Walter-Warner & William F. Cavanaugh, Jr., The Last Time DOJ Sued to 
Block a Vertical Merger was Over Forty Years Ago . . . And It Lost, PATTERSON BELKNAP 
(Jan. 8, 2018), https://bit.ly/2y2bXx7. 
131.  AT &T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 198–200. 
132. At the risk of going off on a bit of a tangent, there is an analogy with the issue 
in ethical theory regarding the relationship of internal and external reasons. Internal reasons 
relate to an agent’s subjective motivation set, including not only the agent’s desires, but 
also “dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and 
various projects . . . embodying commitments of the agent.” BERNARD WILLIAMS, Internal 
and External Reasons, in MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 101, 105 (1981). One issue 
is whether one can rightfully say that an agent has a reason to do something in the absence 
of a motive to do that thing, and another, related issue is what deficiency one can charge 
an agent with, who refuses to do something that is apparently supported by (external) 
reasons – is the agent irrational, or merely deficient in another way, such as being cruel or 
selfish? See SCANLON, supra note 9, at 363–73. Thanks to Evan Fox-Decent for pressing 
me to clarify the distinction between motivating reasons and a sufficient justification for 
an action.  
133. See AT&T, 2018 WL 2930849 at *19. 
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answer is yes, due to the authority relationship established by the law with 
its subjects. The law creates reasons that are objective and external to the 
motivations of citizens.134 Someone who does not care at all about the law 
still has a reason to comply with the law, notwithstanding her lack of 
motivation to do so. What is true of duties is also true of a Hohfeldian 
power such as the government’s capacity to seek to block the merger. The 
relevant legal entitlement exists without regard to a good or bad motive 
for exercising it, subject only to fairly narrow limitations on the selective 
enforcement of antitrust laws. Support for this view about the legal 
authority of government officials and the implications for the fiduciary 
duties of government lawyers also comes from the litigation over the 
Administration’s efforts to enact a ban on entry into the United States from 
nationals of certain, mostly majority Muslim, countries. 
Reaction by courts to the Trump Administration’s travel ban orders 
initially suggested that courts may not readily defer to the reasoning of the 
Executive with respect to fidelity to constitutional norms if they believe 
the President has not exercised his capacity of engaging, in good faith, in 
reasoning about the requirements of law. The deference traditionally 
accorded to the President by the other two branches of government rests 
on the assumption that the President will comply with his constitutionally-
prescribed oath to faithfully execute his office.135 When a reviewing court 
has reason to doubt that the President’s stated reasons are his real reasons, 
it is permitted (or even required) by the Constitution to engage in more 
 
134. See Wendel, supra note 127.  
135. Quinta Jurecic, A New Jurisprudence for an Oathless Presidency, LAWFARE 
(June 2, 2017, 11:25 AM), https://bit.ly/2VIn5x2; Dawn Johnsen, Judicial Deference to 
President Trump, TAKE CARE (May 8, 2017), https://bit.ly/2VIoZxq; Benjamin Wittes & 
Quinta Jurecic, The Revolt of the Judges: What Happens When the Judiciary Doesn’t Trust 
the President’s Oath, LAWFARE (Mar. 16, 2017, 9:24 PM), https://bit.ly/2JL6lxS; Benjamin 
Wittes & Quinta Jurecic, What Happens When We Don’t Believe the President’s Oath?, 
LAWFARE (Mar. 3, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://bit.ly/2n3pD34. As discussed below, the 
Supreme Court upheld the third version of Trump’s executive order. See infra notes 144–
57, and accompanying text. In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy gently reminded the 
President of his oath of office: 
The oath that all officials take to adhere to the Constitution is not confined to 
those spheres in which the Judiciary can correct or even comment upon what 
those officials say or do. Indeed, the very fact that an official may have broad 
discretion, discretion free from judicial scrutiny, makes it all the more imperative 
for him or her to adhere to the Constitution and to its meaning and its promise. 
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring). That passage 
makes one wonder whether Justice Kennedy is acquainted with the current occupant of the 
White House. Indeed, Trump’s reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision was notably 
triumphalist; he characterized it as “a moment of profound vindication following months 
of hysterical commentary from the media and Democratic politicians who refuse to do what 
it takes to secure our border and our country.” See Philip Rucker, Trump Claims Victory 
and Vindication After Supreme Court Upholds Travel Ban, WASH. POST (June 26, 2018), 
https://wapo.st/2HwYjWA.  
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searching review. The Fourth Circuit’s decision on the Administration’s 
second travel ban order accepted the deferential approach ordinarily 
followed when assessing the President’s actions regarding the entry of 
non-citizens into the United States, particularly where there is an asserted 
national security justification.136 The President enjoys broad statutory 
authority to bar entry of non-citizens if he finds that doing so will be in the 
interests of the United States and reviewing courts are instructed to defer 
to a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for the President’s action.137 
The second travel ban order includes a recitation of facts supposedly 
justifying restrictions on entry from several countries, identified as state 
sponsors of terrorism.138 On their face, these reasons would justify the 
denial of permission to enter the United States; the court conceded that the 
asserted national security interests are facially legitimate.139 Nevertheless, 
the Fourth Circuit reached the truly startling conclusion that the President 
had not offered the national security justification in good faith.140 It 
included a lengthy and detailed compilation of statements made by 
President Trump, both as a candidate and after taking office, tending to 
show that he had always intended to enact a “Muslim ban,” regardless of 
whether there was a bona fide national security justification for doing so.141 
The President’s stated reasons were not his real reasons, the court 
suggested. The upshot of this is that reviewing courts need to pay the same 
respect to the President’s decision as they ordinarily would to a fully-
reasoned conclusion regarding immigration and national security policy. 
 
136. See International Refugee Assistance Program v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 
2017), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 (Oct. 10, 2017). The Supreme Court order 
vacating the Fourth Circuit’s decision was based on the expiration of the Executive Order 
on September 24, 2017. Id.  
137. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (granting the President power to suspend or restrict “the 
entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to 
the interests of the United States”); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) 
(stating that courts should not look behind a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for 
denying entry into the country); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (emphasizing that the deferential standard of review in Kleindienst applies with 
particular force in cases involving national security). A reviewing court may evaluate any 
government action for invidious discrimination, based upon the impact of the official 
action, whether there has been a clear pattern unexplainable on other grounds besides 
discrimination, the historical background of the decision, the specific sequence of events 
leading up to the challenged decision, and departures from the normal procedural sequence. 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977). 
Even in applying this analysis, however, reviewing courts generally decline to engage in 
“judicial psychoanalysis” to root out evidence of discriminatory intent. McCreary County 
v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005). 
138. See International Refugee Assistance Program, 857 F.3d at 573–74.  
139. Id. at 591.  
140. Id. at 592. 
141. Id. at 575–77.  
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Building on a suggestion by Evan Fox-Decent, the lawyer’s duty 
when advising the President on a proposal to enact a “Muslim ban” is to 
ensure that standards of fairness and reasonableness are met in the 
decision-making process.142 As it happens, one of the major problems with 
the first travel ban order (referred to as EO-1 in subsequent litigation) was 
the slapdash way in which it was prepared, with none of the inter-agency 
vetting and consultation with counsel that ordinarily precedes such a major 
decision.143 Government lawyers can be faulted for failing to hold the 
Executive to minimally adequate standards of care and consistency in 
reasoning about the direction of official policy. EO-1 was enjoined almost 
immediately, on the grounds of being astonishingly overbroad and 
infringing on the rights of lawful permanent residents, leading to a new 
version, EO-2, that was considered by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits. The 
third version, EO-3, which replaced EO-2 and was the order considered 
by the Supreme Court,144 was adopted after a much more thorough process, 
involving consultation with the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”), the State Department, and the Director of National Intelligence 
(“DNI”), aimed at determining whether foreign governments provide 
adequate security screening for nationals of that country.145 The President 
then issued the order after consultation with multiple Cabinet secretaries 
based on foreign governments’ “capacity, ability, and willingness to 
cooperate with our identity-management and information-sharing policies 
and each country’s risk factors,” and American “foreign policy, national 
security, and counterterrorism goals.”146 The process preceding the 
issuance of EO-3 reflects the lessons learned from the litigation over prior 
versions of the order. 
Judicial skepticism about a government official’s “real” reasons may 
only go so far, and by the time EO-3 made it to the Supreme Court,147 the 
administration had fortified the record with factual findings to support the 
President’s directive. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, 
described in detail the factfinding process led by the DHS,148 and 
 
142. See Fox-Decent, supra note 47, at 264–65 (arguing that fairness and 
reasonableness simply are the content of the fiduciary duty of loyalty when an agent owes 
conflicting duties to beneficiaries with conflicting interests).  
143. See Benjamin Wittes, Malevolence Tempered by Incompetence: Trump’s 
Horrifying Executive Order on Refugees and Visas, LAWFARE (Jan. 28, 2017, 10:58 PM), 
https://bit.ly/2k4AVUd. 
144. See generally Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
145. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 
2017). 
146. Id. at 9.  
147. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2392.  
148. Id. at 2405. 
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continued to refer to it as a “worldwide, multi-agency review.”149 
Referring to the statutory language permitting the President to deny entry 
to a class of aliens if he finds that entry would be detrimental to national 
security, Chief Justice Roberts again mentioned the “comprehensive 
evaluation” by DHS and other agencies of the vetting process employed 
by foreign governments to determine the risk presented by their nationals, 
and described the 12-page Proclamation of EO-3 as more detailed than any 
prior President had issued under that provision of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.150 One of the plaintiffs’ arguments in the litigation, of 
course, was that President Trump himself did not believe a word of the 
Proclamation or care about the findings of the DHS evaluation, and was 
motivated instead by anti-Muslim bias (or the desire to appeal to his 
supporters’ anti-Muslim bias).151 The “facially legitimate and bona fide” 
standard of review established by Kleindienst152 is ambiguous with respect 
to the requirement of sincerity or, to put it differently, to the possibility 
that a facially legitimate reason is merely a pretext.153 “Facially legitimate” 
suggests that a reason is legally sufficient even if it is not the motivation 
for the government official’s action, whereas “bona fide” could be read to 
require that the official’s asserted reason is the actual reason for the action. 
The majority did accept the invitation of the plaintiffs to look beyond the 
President’s asserted justification, and considered some extrinsic evidence 
of his motivation, but it employed only deferential rational-basis review.154 
As the majority understood this standard of review, as long as the travel 
ban had some (objective) relationship to legitimate state interests, it should 
be upheld.155 
The key passage in the analysis comes near the end of Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinion, where he responds to the invocation by Justice 
Sotomayor’s dissent to the Court’s approval of the internment of Japanese-
Americans during World War II: 
 
149. Id. at 2409; see also id. at 2408 (again referring to “a worldwide review process 
undertaken by multiple Cabinet officials and their agencies”).  
150. Id. at 2408.  
151. Id. at 2417. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent uses Trump’s own words to make a 
powerful case that “a reasonable observer would conclude that the Proclamation was driven 
primarily by anti-Muslim animus, rather than by the Government’s asserted national-
security justifications.” Id. at 2438 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
152. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 770 (1972).  
153. Sincerity, or saying what one believes, is one of the virtues supporting the value 
of truthfulness; it supports flourishing practices of trust and reciprocity. See BERNARD 
WILLIAMS, TRUTH & TRUTHFULNESS: AN ESSAY IN GENEALOGY 11, 119 (2002). In the terms 
of Williams’s political ethics in Truth & Truthfulness, the question is whether a legal 
standard requiring only a facially neutral justification provides a sufficient degree of 
trustworthiness to support the assertion of legitimate (that is, rightful) authority by the state.  
154. Trump v. Hawaii, at 2420.  
155. Id. at 2420–21. 
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[T]he dissent invokes Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944). 
Whatever rhetorical advantage the dissent may see in doing so, 
Korematsu has nothing to do with this case . . . . The entry suspension is 
an act that is well within executive authority and could have been taken 
by any other President – the only question is evaluating the actions of 
this particular President in promulgating an otherwise valid 
Proclamation.156 
The comparison between the lawful authority of “any other 
President” and the actions of “this particular President” clearly indicates 
that the majority of the Court believes there are objective, external criteria 
for determining when the President is acting in good faith. If any other 
President could have reached the conclusion that the listed countries were 
providing inadequate security, then the travel ban is constitutional, 
notwithstanding President Trump’s clearly and repeated expressed anti-
Muslim bias and desire to enact a Muslim ban. Justice Sotomayor calls 
this a “blinkered” approach to deference,157 but the majority’s position can 
also be understood not as ignorance, but as indifference. What matters for 
the majority is the hypothetical justifiability of the government’s position, 
not what motivated the travel ban order. Even if all of the Justices’ 
opinions share “the strong suspicion that the process was engineered to 
justify a preexisting outcome that had its roots in incompetent and bigoted 
demagoguery,”158 the majority refuses to consider the possibility that what 
might otherwise be a justifiable exercise of power may cease to be lawful 
if the President does not himself internalize and act upon minimal 
standards of consistency and sincerity.  
The travel ban litigation thus illustrates an important limitation on the 
extent to which fiduciary theory modifies the standard conception of legal 
ethics. A lawyer’s ethical role is still to facilitate the exercise of the client’s 
capacities. Importantly, however, the client’s capacities are to a significant 
extent defined by the applicable law. If the law permits an action based on 
objectively sufficient reasons, then the fact that the client’s actual motives 
are at variance with those reasons is not necessarily a reason to believe the 
action will be unlawful. In the hypothetical involving the AT&T and Time 
Warner merger, if there is a factually and legally sufficient basis for the 
government to object to the merger, a DOJ Antitrust Division lawyer’s 
fiduciary obligation is ultimately to assist the government in opposing the 
 
156. Id. at 2423. 
157. Id. at 2438 n.3, 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“By blindly accepting the 
Government’s misguided invitation to sanction a discriminatory policy motivated by 
animosity toward a disfavored group, all in the name of a superficial claim of national 
security, the Court redeploys the same dangerous logic underlying Korematsu and merely 
replaces one ‘gravely wrong’ decision with another.”). 
158. Benjamin Wittes, Reflections on the Travel Ban Case and the Constitutional 
Status of Pretext, LAWFARE (July 6, 2018), http://bit.ly/2YLr7BH. 
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merger. The lawyer’s belief that the President’s motivation differs from 
the factual and legal grounds for the objection is irrelevant to the lawyer’s 
professional duty of loyalty. The ethical prescription would change, 
however, if the law were different. If the Supreme Court had come out 
differently in the travel ban case and permitted a showing that there was a 
discriminatory purpose lying behind the facially neutral government 
action,159 then a government lawyer as a fiduciary would have been 
permitted, or even required, to refuse to assist the relevant agencies (DHS, 
etc.) in implementing the President’s proposal. This section will conclude 
by briefly considering the source and content of this duty. 
Lawyers may not “counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in 
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.”160 By some kind 
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius logic, however, many lawyers read 
this rule as negating any professional obligation to refrain from counseling 
or assisting unlawful client conduct that is not a crime or fraud. For 
example, after a conclusion by the Justice Department’s Office of 
Professional Responsibility that lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel 
had engaged in professional misconduct by drafting badly reasoned 
memos purportedly permitting torture, Deputy Attorney General David 
Margolis took an extremely formalistic view of the lawyers’ duties.161 He 
refused to find a violation of applicable legal standards, although he said 
it was a close question.162 I have argued that the Margolis Memo must be 
read in light of the sympathy a DOJ lawyer would have for other lawyers 
in the Department working in the immediate aftermath of the September 
11, 2001, terrorist attacks, subject to enormous political pressure to 
unshackle the national-security apparatus.163 It should not be understood, 
however, as warranting the conclusion that there is no professional duty to 
ensure that a government official’s or agency’s conduct complies with 
applicable legal requirements. That duty is not stated in a single rule of 
professional conduct, but rather is a summary of much of the law 
 
159. See International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 559 
(2017) (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
266–68 (1977)). Interestingly, the dissenting opinions in the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Trump v. Hawaii did not employ the Arlington Heights test, relying instead on First 
Amendment religious-freedom cases such as Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520 (1993), and McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union 
of Ky., 545 U. S. 844 (2005). See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2429, 2434. The upshot 
is the same, however; if the plaintiffs had proven that the President had acted out of hostility 
toward Islam and Muslims and not for his stated national-security purposes, the travel ban 
would have been unconstitutional.  
160. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
161. Memorandum from the Assoc. Deputy Attorney Gen. to the Attorney Gen. (Jan. 
5, 2010) [hereinafter Margolis Memo]. 
162. Id. at 12, 67. 
163. Wendel, supra note 127, at 313–14. 
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governing lawyers, which includes rule-based and common-law duties of 
competence, diligence, independence, loyalty, honesty, and 
communication.164 What distinguishes lawyers from other agents is their 
obligation to carry out the lawful instructions of the principal, as defined 
by the client after consultation,165 and the lawyer’s inherent (non-
waivable) authority to refuse to assist in conduct that the lawyer believes 
to be unlawful.166  
In terms of fiduciary theory, lawyers do exercise some aspect of the 
client’s capacity substitutively, but the client’s legal capacity, which is 
what lawyer-agents exercise, is limited to the powers that are conferred on 
the client by law. If the law prohibits some action, like banning all 
Muslims from entering the United States, a lawyer may not assist the 
President in performing it. The Supreme Court’s travel ban decision does 
not alter this aspect of the lawyer’s ethical role; it merely concludes that, 
objectively speaking, there were sufficient grounds for the President’s 
actions. In a different case, however, lawyers should not assume that their 
role as fiduciaries somehow limits their obligation to ensure their client’s 
compliance with the law. 
C. Artificial Intelligence and Reason-Giving by Lawyers 
Many of the tasks traditionally performed by lawyers involve dealing 
with large volumes of information, and computers are very good at 
executing instructions for the processing of information.167 Computers 
already out-perform human experts at many tasks.168 We have all heard 
accounts of IBM Deep Blue technology beating Garry Kasparov at chess, 
the company’s Watson system winning at Jeopardy; less familiar (but to 
experts, more impressive) is the story of Google’s DeepMind AlphaGo 
computer beating top-ranked human players at the game of Go.169 It would, 
 
164. Id. at 312–13.  
165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16(1) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000).  
166. Id. § 23(1). 
167. Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots Be Lawyers: Computers, Lawyers, and 
the Practice of Law, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 508 (2017). 
168. See RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF THE PROFESSIONS: 
HOW TECHNOLOGY WILL TRANSFORM THE WORK OF HUMAN EXPERTS 45 (2015). 
169. See, e.g., Darrell Etherington, Google’s AlphaGo AI Beats the World’s Best 
Human Go Player, TECHCRUNCH, https://tcrn.ch/2LVd1fH; David Z. Morris, Google’s Go 
Computer Beats Top-Ranked Human, FORTUNE (Mar. 12, 2016), http://bit.ly/2LWmfbv. 
Go is a significantly greater programming challenge than chess, because there are so many 
possible combinations of moves that a computer cannot simply calculate the best strategy 
by brute force. The real leap forward for Google’s Go computer is moving from being 
trained on a massive database of human-played games to a self-teaching algorithm that 
worked from the rules of the game toward previously unknown strategies. See Matthew 
Hutson, This Computer Program Can Beat Humans at Go – With No Human Instruction, 
SCIENCE (Oct. 18, 2017), http://bit.ly/2WStuC9.  
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therefore, appear to be only a matter of time before improving information 
technology systems prove themselves superior to human lawyers. 
Predictive coding systems have already greatly reduced the donkey work 
involved in privilege reviews preceding a document production and the 
review of the adversary’s production for relevant documents.170 Artificial 
intelligence (AI) provides similar advantages for transactional due 
diligence. Decision-support software in widespread use for litigation 
strategy purposes reveals patterns from past litigation showing judicial 
attitudes toward certain types of motions and arguments, and the 
advantage of specific venues. Going beyond rudimentary applications like 
LegalZoom and Rocket Lawyer, contract drafting software supported by 
machine learning and deep-learning techniques may enable the rapid, 
inexpensive development of bespoke contracts covering a wide variety of 
contingencies, based on relative parsimonious user input of key terms and 
conditions.171 Applications like Lex Machina reveal patterns in case 
outcomes associated with specific law firms, allowing in-house lawyers to 
make better-informed decisions regarding the employment of outside 
counsel. At least so far, AI is used to assist lawyers and make them more 
efficient.  
One does not have to be a Luddite, however, to fear that increasingly 
powerful AI may lead, in the not-so-distant future, to the complete 
replacement of human lawyers. If a client can turn to an online legal 
guidance application to determine the risks associated with standard 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association transactions (for 
sophisticated clients), or obtain information about legal issues related to 
healthcare services (for individual clients),172 then lawyers may find 
themselves “disrupted” and “disintermediated”—to use two very au 
courant terms—out of employment. After all, taxi medallion owners and 
the Eastman Kodak Co. once thought they had very secure business 
models.  
Some of the traditional functions of lawyers are more resistant than 
others to encroachments by AI-based systems. For the foreseeable future, 
it seems extremely unlikely that computers will replace lawyers at tasks 
such as: (1) fact investigation, including making a judgment about the 
relevant avenues of investigation, determining where relevant documents 
are likely to be located, and interviewing witnesses173; (2) negotiation over 
 
170. Dana A. Remus, The Uncertain Promise of Predictive Coding, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
1691 (2014). 
171. See, e.g, RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? : RETHINKING THE NATURE 
OF LEGAL SERVICES 100–05 (2008); Beverly Rich, How AI Is Changing Contracts, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Feb. 12, 2018), http://bit.ly/2QfvcLA. 
172. SUSSKIND, supra note 171, at 122–23. 
173. Remus & Levy, supra note 167, at 527. 
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issues such as the terms on which to settle a case or provisions in a 
transaction174; (3) the type of client counseling requiring emotional 
intelligence, such as listening empathetically to a client in a matrimonial 
dispute to determine the client’s goals, and then providing advice about 
what options are legally available175; (4) in-court appearances on behalf of 
clients, at a trial, evidentiary hearing, or oral argument on a motion or an 
appeal.176 One might therefore ask, what is it about these functions that 
makes them more resistant to automation? Although space permits only 
the beginning of a response here, I believe the answer turns on the function 
of law and lawyers of facilitating the human capacity for connection, 
relationships of recognition and accountability, and maintenance of a 
political community which presupposes that its citizens are free and equal.  
Law is a human artifact, intended to serve human needs. (The same 
is true of corporations – hence the “moral nexus-of-contracts” view 
discussed in Section III.A.) I have been assuming a Kantian account of 
morality very much like that defended by Stephen Darwall: 
[M]oral norms regulate a community of equal, morally accountable, free 
and rational agents as such, and moral obligations are the demands such 
agents have standing to address to one another and with which they are 
mutually accountable for complying.177 
Add to this a premise about the objective pluralism of values178 and 
the need within a political community for a means to guide and coordinate 
conduct,179 and a functional theory emerges about the relationship between 
 
174. Id. at 527–29 (discussing a company called Modria that offers technology for 
handling relatively small disputes. It uses software that identifies areas of agreement and 
disagreement, and makes suggestions for resolving the dispute. There is a significant gap, 
however, between the abilities of Modria’s current system and what would be required to 
negotiate larger, more complex disputes).  
175. See AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L.F. FELSTEINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR 
CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 53–63 (1995) (describing the 
fluidity of client goals, objectives, and expectations, and the counseling required to match 
up the client’s conception of his or her interest with what is “realistic” or legally possible). 
176. Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) platforms such as Modria facilitate the 
settlement of relatively simple claims, using automated processes. See SUSSKIND & 
SUSSKIND, supra note 168, at 70. However, this is a far cry from presenting witnesses and 
evidence, and dealing with fact finding and credibility issues.  
177. DARWALL, supra note 2, at 101. I have written about political morality, and legal 
obligation, proceeding from the first-person plural standpoint. See WENDEL, supra note 1, 
at 13. I was unaware that Gerald Postema had made much the same point, using the same 
terminology. See Gerald J. Postema, Morality in the First Person Plural, 14 L. & PHIL. 35 
(1995). 
178. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND 191, 
239 (Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., 1998). 
179. SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 170–72 (setting out the Moral Aim Thesis, which is 
that “the law is first and foremost a social planning mechanism whose aim is to rectify the 
moral deficiencies of the circumstances of legality,” which in turn is defined as a 
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law and morality. The law can be seen as a technology for giving the types 
of reasons that human moral agents owe to one another, in response to 
others’ demands for accountability. A contract is the memorialization of 
the parties’ duties assumed toward each other, in light of their mutual 
expectations regarding responsibilities for certain contingencies. Other 
mechanisms for private ordering, such as wills and business entities, are 
available to facilitate planning and coordination. The law regarding 
involuntarily assumed obligations—primarily tort and criminal law—
embodies societal expectations for minimally respectful conduct when the 
interests of others are implicated. Regulatory law embodies complex 
policy tradeoffs between risks, harms, and the costs of prevention. And 
public law governs the relationship between citizens and the state, 
protecting individual rights and establishing procedures that confine and 
regularize the power of the state.  
Underlying all of these specific manifestations of law is something 
more general pertaining to the relationship between legal obligation and 
authority and the pre-legal moral and other reasons individuals would 
otherwise have. Moral accountability requires sufficient reasons for 
actions that affect the rights of others. It is perfectly conceivable that AI-
based software and a massive database of legal decisions could summarize 
the results of legal disputes. Presumably machine-learning and deep-
learning technology would also permit the software to improve at the 
process of responding in the right way to the reasons underlying those 
conclusions of law. If it did, then AI could produce results that a human 
observer would recognize as equivalent to a legal judgment.180 If a 
computer can beat the world’s top-ranked player of Go, it seems feasible 
that AI could be adapted to determine how something like a tort dispute 
would be resolved. From that conclusion, a human decision-maker could 
presumably conclude that she would not be held liable for not taking a 
particular safety precaution or making a design change to a product. 
 
community having “numerous and serious moral problems whose solutions are complex, 
contentious, or arbitrary”).  
180. In the realm of ethical decision making, machine-learning systems have been 
developed that make judgments about the application of general principles to specific 
cases, using inductive logic to infer rules that human experts have apparently followed 
(even if unconsciously) in deciding prior cases. See WENDELL WALLACH & COLIN ALLEN, 
MORAL MACHINES: TEACHING ROBOTS RIGHT FROM WRONG 27–28, 127–29 (2009) 
(describing MedEthEx); see also Colin Allen et al., Prolegomena to Any Future Artificial 
Moral Agent, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL & THEORETICAL A.I. 251, 258 (2000) (arguing that an 
alternative to programming an AI system to use rules or principles would be attempting “to 
produce agents which happen to make morally proper decisions by modeling the moral 
behavior of humans”). For example, a system called MedEthEx, developed by a computer 
scientist and a bioethicist, is aimed at helping clinicians determine the best course of action 
when a situation presents conflicts of values such as autonomy and beneficence. Id. The 
system “discovers” or makes explicit the decision principles underlying the prior cases. Id. 
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Human lawyers already use online databases like Westlaw and Lexis to 
conduct legal research. What, if anything, would be lost by further 
“disintermediating” human lawyers by permitting a client to consult a 
Watson or Google DeepMind-based platform to determine whether the 
law permits or requires some conduct?  
Take an extremely simple example. Trendy Eyewear, Inc., markets a 
line of sunglasses that is popular with professional baseball players. Not 
surprisingly, Little League, high school, and college baseball players buy 
many of these sunglasses. After reading reports of an accident in which a 
Little League player was hit in the face with a baseball, shattering his 
sunglasses and causing an eye laceration, Trendy wonders whether it 
should include a warning on its product, stating that the sunglasses are not 
shatter resistant and not intended to provide protection from impact. 
Trendy further wants to know if it does add a warning, whether the 
warning should be on the package, in the form of a removable sticker on 
the sunglasses themselves, or perhaps only in the instructions that come 
with the sunglasses. The most current statement by the American Law 
Institute on the duty of a manufacturer to warn of a risk provides as 
follows: 
A product . . . is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings 
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been 
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or 
warnings by the seller . . . and the omission of the instructions or 
warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.181 
A comment to that section summarizes the well-established principle 
that a product seller does not have to warn of dangers that “should be 
obvious to, or generally known by, foreseeable product users.”182 
A human lawyer would immediately notice the issues calling for the 
exercise of judgment. What risks are generally known? Would a 
reasonable consumer expect baseball sunglasses to be more shatter-
resistant than ordinary sunglasses? Is there something about the marketing 
of the product to athletes that carries an implied representation of safety 
when used in connection with that sport? Does it matter that the product is 
marketed to, or used by, a youthful population that may not be as well-
informed about the relevant risks? Would the sunglasses not be reasonable 
safe unless they were accompanied by a warning? What language would 
be adequate to warn the user of the risk? Is there a risk of over-warning or 
warnings clutter if the sunglasses are accompanied by a warning of a risk 
that ordinary consumers are well aware of? Even if liability considerations 
cut slightly in favor of including the warning, would the manufacturer look 
 
181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(c) (AM. LAW INST.1998). 
182. Id. at cmt. j. 
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a bit ridiculous for doing so, given its brand identity as an aggressive and 
edgy accessory for people who want to look cool?  
There are, of course, a zillion cases dealing with a manufacturer’s 
liability for failure to warn. The difficulty is that they deal with an almost 
limitless range of situations in which people are exposed to different types 
of risks. A purchaser of baby oil would presumably know it is not a good 
idea to drink it, but may not be aware that babies and young children who 
aspirate it into their lungs may suffocate and suffer brain damage or 
death.183 But a purchaser of spray-on hair and body oil might be held to 
knowledge that inhaling the spray could cause injury or death.184 If the hair 
oil case is summarized as standing for the principle that “knowledge of a 
lesser risk includes appreciation of a greater risk,” then how should a 
reasoner (whether a human lawyer or an AI system) deal with a case 
holding that a user’s understanding that an elastic exercise band can snap 
back and hit you in the eye did not appreciate the risk of a resulting retinal 
detachment?185 Maybe that case is just an outlier but there are other, similar 
cases such as one holding that the general knowledge of the risks of 
drinking alcohol did not include knowledge of the risk of fatal pancreatitis 
resulting from moderate alcohol consumption.186 On the issue of the 
adequacy of warnings, there is similar uncertainty. For example, one 
notorious decision held that a warning of “risk of blood clotting leading to 
paralysis or death” on a prescription medication did not adequately inform 
the consumer of the risk of a stroke, even though blood clotting causing 
paralysis or death is the same thing as a stroke, the plaintiff contended that 
the warning given lacked the emotive impact of the word “stroke.”187  
Even with a gigantic database of decided cases, the exercise of 
judgment is required to determine which cases are outliers and which 
follow the underlying rule. Judgment is also required to determine relevant 
similarities among cases. As H.L.A. Hart observed, “[p]articular fact-
situations do not await us already marked off from each other, and labeled 
as instances of the general rule.”188 Proponents of AI might respond that 
pattern-recognition is one of the core competencies of expert Go players, 
and yet deep-learning technology enabled a computer to beat the very best 
Go masters. At least in principle there seems to be no reason to believe 
that a computer could not do similarly well at discerning patterns in 
decided cases. A deeper problem, however, is the combination of the 
 
183. See generally Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Prods. Co., 797 P.2d 527 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1990).  
184. See generally Greene v. A.P. Prods., Ltd., 717 N.W.2d 855 (Mich. 2006).  
185. See generally Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1957).  
186. See generally Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987). 
187. See generally MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985). 
188. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126 (2d ed. 1994). 
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indeterminacy of the values underlying the results in particular cases and 
the law’s openness to resolving the balance of values differently in cases 
that might arise in the future.189 A lawyer might perceive a new situation 
as falling within the core of an existing rule, as being on the margin 
between two rules (or a rule and its exceptions), or as being governed by 
no existing rule at all. In all of those cases the lawyer must make a 
judgment based on her best understanding of the policies and values that 
underlie the relevant area of law. And of course, those policies and values 
are likely to be in tension. The law of products liability seeks to protect 
consumers from the risk of defective products, but also to avoid imposing 
onerous and unjustified liability costs on manufacturers, which would 
have the negative consequence of reducing the availability of useful 
products and the choices available to consumers. Not only are legal rules 
indeterminate, but the policies underlying them are indeterminate as well.  
Notwithstanding this complexity, AI that is currently available, or 
will be available in the near future, may be able to handle the task of 
predicting the outcome of a hypothetical failure-to-warn claim regarding 
the sunglasses. That is to say, it mimics the result of the exercise of 
judgment by a human decision-maker. The result of this computation, 
however, is still only a prediction. It lacks the essential feature of a 
conclusion of law. Law is not just a prediction, from an external point of 
view, of what will occur under specified conditions. Being able to predict 
the application of legal rules to particular fact situations is one aspect of 
being a lawyer, but it is important not to confuse the competent use of a 
thing with the thing itself. Law is fundamentally a reason that permits or 
requires an action and is therefore an answer to a demand for 
accountability. The demand for moral accountability presupposes mutual 
recognition of both parties as free and equal, and as bearers of dignity. A 
sophisticated algorithm and a comprehensive database only get us so far. 
It may predict that a judge or a jury in the failure-to-warn case would, let’s 
say, exonerate the manufacturer from liability. What it cannot do, 
however, is express the relationship of accountability that is involved in a 
moral justification. Imagine a conversation between an injured baseball 
player and a high-level officer of the manufacturer, in which the player 
asks, “why didn’t you do more to protect me, by warning me of the risk?” 
The answer would be that the warning was not required, because of a 
balance struck by the law among competing policies such as consumer 
protection and avoiding the cost of unnecessary (and perhaps patronizing) 
warnings. The ethical quality of the reasons given by the manufacturer’s 
officer depends on the mutual recognition of the officer and the consumer 
as equally deserving of respect. Respect for human dignity is manifested, 
 
189. Id. at 130–36. 
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in a large-scale, decentralized, complex community in part through respect 
for law. At bottom, however, the authority and obligatory force of the law 
depends on its service of human moral ends.190  
A computer may assist lawyers in finding governing statutes and 
cases, predicting judicial decisions, and structuring agreements that 
embody the intentions of the parties. What it cannot do, by its nature, is do 
anything more than serve as a means to the moral end of expressing mutual 
recognition and respect. Whether it makes sense to think of a human 
principal and a computer agent as standing in a fiduciary relationship 
depends on whether the computer adequately furthers the principal’s 
capacity of exercising moral agency in responding to a demand for 
accountability. Fulfilling fiduciary duties generally requires a (human) 
lawyer to engage with a human client’s reasons and values in order to 
enable the client to express them through the medium of law in the client’s 
dealings with others. A computer can no more be a fiduciary—and thus a 
substitute for a human lawyer—than a typewriter can. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
To a greater extent than any other fiduciary context, the lawyer-client 
relationship involves a principal-agent relationship of trust and confidence 
with a fundamentally moral end. The client’s capacity, which the lawyer 
as fiduciary helps exercise, is that of assuming a relationship of mutual 
respect and accountability with others. In a well-functioning relationship, 
the result is a normative division of labor, with the client having moral 
responsibility for the impact of the representation on others. The situations 
considered in this paper involve a breakdown in the principal’s capacity to 
fulfill the capacity of offering a reasoned justification to affected third 
parties. In those cases, the lawyer’s ordinary privilege of moral non-
accountability no longer holds. The lawyer’s professional role changes in 
important ways, in the direction of taking greater personal responsibility 
for the morality of the client’s actions. Fiduciary theory thus suggests a 
refinement on the standard conception of ethics bring it more into line, in 




190. See RAZ, supra note 44, at 56–59 (setting out the service conception of 
authorities, which holds that authorities are justified insofar as they improve the capability 
of people at complying with practical and moral principles). 
